John 1:14a and Rudolf Bultmann's hermeneutical method by Labron, Timothy
CENTRE FOR NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES 
TOTAL OF 10 PAGES ONLY 
MAY BE XEROXED 








A thesis submitted to the 
School of Graduate Studies 
in partial fidfi1ment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
Department of Religious Studies 




"Kcx\ 6 A.6yo<; oup~ eyeve'to"-'~and the Word became flesh'~ (John l:l4a)-
-is a key verse in the thoughtofRudolfBultmann His interpretation of this verse 
is, in fact, paradigmatic for understanding his whole hermeneutical method Yet 
the conventional understanding of his interpretation of l: l4a and, consequendy, 
his hermeneutical metho~ is beset with misunderstandings. 
The difficulty of understanding Bultmann' s hermeneutical method results 
from placing it in a Cartesian context, which seeks a clear and objective 
interpretation. Bultmann' s thought, however, resists such Cartesian 
contextualization. A post-structural context, which similarly rejects Cartesianism, 
is better suited as a context for understanding Bultmann' s thought 
It is imperative, however, that John l:l4a and the theological principle of 
justification by faith be shown as the core of his thought, rather than reducing his 
hermeneutical method to a philosophy. By the juxtaposition of a post-structmal 
context, John l:l4a, and justification by faith, a renewed and more fruitful 
discussion of Bultmann and his hermeneutical method may follow. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JOHN 1: 14a IN THE THOUGHT OF 
RUDOLF BULTMANN 
Introduction 
'"Ka\ 6 .A.oyoc; mxp; eyeve-ro''-"and the Word became flesh" (John l:l4a)-
-is perhaps the key verse in the Gospel of Jo~ and as such it played a significant 
role in the formation ofRudolfBultmann's thought. It has also been the 
traditional verse by which the Christian tradition has affinned a realistic 
incarnation in reaction to docetic claims. It is not surprising, then, that much of the 
discussion ofBultmann's thought revolves around his exegesis and/or source 
criticism of 1:14a. But often such studies reject Bultmann's Gnostic source theory 
and his incarnational exegesis and then proceed to reject his entire thought on the 
basis of this rejection of his source criticism and exegesis. The present 
examination of Bultmann, however, will not examine the exegesis or source 
criticism of Bultmann, but rather will focus on his hermeneutic. Bultmann states 
very well the intended aim of his task, "Our task is to discover the hermeneutical 
1 
2 
principle by which we understand what is said in the Bible."l Thus7 the question 
of this thesis will not be what is the source material behind 1: 14a, or for that matter 
the source material of the prologue itsel( but rather: "what is the relation between 
1: 14a as it stands and Bultmann 7 s hermeneutic?" 
The question may well be raise~ if it is shown that Bultmann7 S 
foundational assumptions are flawed, that is, those dealing with his exegesis and 
source criticism, then is it credible to focus exclusively on his hermeneutic? A 
simple answer to this question is yes. If it is the case that Bultmann 's gnostic 
source theory is incorrect it does not necessarily add or remove any weight from 
his interpretation of 1: 14a that focuses on the "flesh.,. In other words, it is 
legitimate to differentiate between the origins of Bultmann 's thought and its 
substance. Just as the text of John itself is often interpreted as it stands, z so now 
Bultmann's thought will be discussed as it stands. The above mentioned critiques 
of Bultmann do not, therefore, negate the viability of examining his hermeneutic. 
1Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, ed. and trans. Schubert M. 
Ogden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 54. 
2David Haw~ The Johannine World (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1996) , 60. 
3 
As Ashton notes Bultmann~s work is difficult to access because it 
exemplifies the 'hermeneutical circle' .3 The hermeneutical circle means that "we 
can understand the whole only in terms of its constituent parts and the parts only in 
terms of the whole."4 To access this circle the first chapter of this thesis will focus 
upon Bultmann' s interpretation of 1: l4a., and in order to fully show the 
significance of 1:14a in Bultmann's thought we will focus on Kasemann's critique 
of Bultmann. For it is Kasemann, himself an. outstanding student of Bultmann, 
who sees more clearly than most the significance of John 1:14a for Bultmann's 
thought. Kasemann deals with this verse explicitly in The Testament of Jesus. The 
question to be raised first, then, is not what is the source behind 1: 14a, but what is 
the interpretation of 1: 14a as it now stands in the Gospel? 
The contrasting interpretation between Bultmann and Kasemann is 
specifically based on the interpretation of "6 A6yo<; crap; eyeve'to." For 
example, is it an unquestioned humanity-"tlesh" --that the Word becomes, or is it 
simply a manner of asserting that the Word entered the world? Bultmann 
3John Ashton, Understanding The Fourth Gospel (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 45. 
"Hawkin, The Johannine World, 45. 
maintains that the Word does indeed become flesh literally, while Kasemann 
considers flesh to be a figurative expression. 
4 
These differing interpretations of 1: 14a point to a paradigm of interpretation 
that carries beyond 1:14a itself. Bultmann's interpretation of 1:14a is, in fact the 
best entry into his hermeneutical circle and is the paradigm of his historical method 
and theological understanding. Accordingly, the second chapter of this thesis will 
continue the investigation of Bultmann with a more detailed look at his method of 
interpretation in relation to his historical and theological thought. 
The first two chapters, the~ examine the significance of 1: 14a for 
Bultmann as a paradigm of his method of interpretation. The third chapter will 
discuss Bulnnann's method of interpretation, which has been brought to light 
through the study of 1:14a, and his historical and theological thought, in a post· 
structuralist context by showing that he has an anti-Cartesian influence in his 
method. It will then be shown that a post·structuralist context, in contrast to a 
Cartesian context, is a fruitful context for a discussion ofBulnnann and 1:14a. Yet 
the significance of 1:14a will distance him from post-structuralism and will point 
to the core of his hermeneutic. 
s 
We may thus proceed to the task ofBultmann, to find the method of 
interpretation with which to interpret the Bible~ and to the question, "What is 
Bultmann's method?" 
Bultmann and the Paradox of John 1:14a 
To understand Bultmann' s hermeneutical method it is necessary to first 
examine his interpretation of 1: 14a which is, in essence, the paradigm of his 
method. As the paradigm of his method l:l4a is not, in any manner, underrated by 
Bultmann. He ranks l:l4a as the most significant verse of the Gospel, and, 
moreover, he says that "the main theme of the Gospel is 6 A.oyoc; ocxp~ eyive't'o."s 
No matter from which direction a study of Bultmann is ventured it is evident that 
an examination of l: 14a is necessary as a result of the great significance that 
Bultmann himself places upon it. 
Bultmann considers l: 14a, as the main theme of the Gospel and its most 
significant verse, to be more than a speculative comment. Rather than 1: 14a being 
a general principle or abstract concept, Bultmann maintains that there is a singular 
5Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John: a Commentary, trans. G.R. Beasley-
Murray (Philadelphia: The Westminster·Press), 64. See also Bulhnann, Theology 
of The New Testament, vol. IL trans. Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1955), 40. 
6 
distinctiveness and great significance in the verse. More specifically, Bultmann 
states, "now the riddle is solved, the miracle is proclaimed: the Logos became 
flesh!"6 The significance of this statement is conveyed most accurately through an 
examination of what Bultmann means by "flesh.'' 
The importance of this comment, "the Logos became flesh!" and the 
significance of the ''flesh," can be demonstrated by contrasting it with, for 
example, Gnosticism. Bultmann understands the Revealer to be a particular body 
and flesh, not body and flesh in general; hence, unlike the Gnostic redeemer, for 
whom place and time are of no importance along with the historical traditio~ the 
Revealer, as Bultm.ann understands him, is a particular body of flesh in space and 
time. 7 What is passed on through 1: 14a is not a timeless idea, but a particular 
body/flesh and an historical event. 3 
Moreover. the particular Revealer does not merely present an occasion for 
reflexion after which the individual can do without as is the case in Gnosticism, 
but rather is a decisive eschatological situation. 9 This decisive situation posits a 





particular person and history that Bultmann considers necessary if 1: 14a is to be 
significant. 10 Bultmann states that "revelation is an event with an other-worldly 
origin, but this event, if it is to have any significance for men, must take place in 
the human sphere."11 In other words, Bul1mann is saying that if 1: 14a does not 
take place in "the human sphere," or if it is only a general concept, then it is 
essentially of no importance or relevance to humans. However, since Bultmann 
considers 1: l4a to point to a particular person and history he maintains that "the 
Revealer appears not as man-in-general ... but as a definite human being in 
history." 12 
Despite being the main theme of the Gospel and its most significant verse, 
according to Bulbnann, 1: 14a incongruously reveals nothing more than '"the word 
became flesh." It does seem peculiar that for all the emphasis of flesh, history, and 
particularity that Bulnnann places on l: 14~ it reveals nothing more than the 
10Uris 'decisive eschatological situation' will be examined in more detail in 
chapter two where it will be shown to be a decision, or faith. For the moment let it 
suffice to show that the event itself of John 1: l4a is necessarily occurring in the 
'human sphere'. 
lllbid., 61. 
1ZSulttnann, Theology of the New Testament, 41. 
statement that "the word became flesh." Yet Bultmann insists that "Jesus as the 
Revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the revealer."13 
8 
This insistence ofBultmann that what is revealed is only that Jesus is the 
revealer raises the question, for example, of what has happened to the glory? Can 
it be seemingly dismissed so easily? Bultmann says that the Revealer does not fill 
others with an awe of the gl01y, but rather, "according to John, the Divine is the 
very counter-pole to the human, with the result that it is a parado~ an offense, that 
the Word became flesh" He then continues by commenting that in fact the divinity 
of the revealer is hidden. 14 Despite the hiddenness of the glory it is important to 
note that Bultmann is not negating the glory since he says that the Revealer 
"really'' possesses the glory, 15 but rather is placing it outside of human 
wtderstanding. 
This is the paradoxical nature of the revelation, that the flesh is not the 
temporary container of glory, nor does it show the glory. 16 Bultmann comments 




tsBultmann, The Gospel of John, 68. 
16Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 50. 
9 
Incarnate, and indeed it is only as the Incarnate that it is present at all"17 Thus, 
the glory, in conjunction with 1:14a, creates a paradox as noted by Bultmann, ''this 
is the paradox which runs though the whole gospel: the oo~cx [glory] is not seen 
alongside the crap~ [flesh], nor through the (J(Xp~ as through a window; it is to be 
seen in the crap~ and nowhere else."18 If the glory is to be seen Bultmann points, 
paradoxically, to the Passion, not a ''heavenly luminosity."19 
The above paradox of the hidden glory-which would not be a paradox at all 
if Bultmann negated the glory-arises from Bultmann' s interpretation of 1: 14a and 
is directly connected to "an offence!' Bultmann states that ''the event of the 
revelation is a question, is an offence. This and nothing else is what is meant by 6 
A.6yoc; crap~ ey€ve"to.''2° Furthermore, Bultmann states that, contrary to seeing the 
divinity, "to be confronted with the Revealer is not to be presented with a 
persuasive set of answers [or an overwhelming glory] but only to be faced with a 
11Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 63. 
1%id., 63. 
1~udolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith 
(London: SCM Press, 1966), 281. 
20Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 62. 
10 
question."21 This question is not answered with either general propositions or 
with an overwhelming glory.22 
The result of the offensive and paradoxical nature of 1: 14' and the 
resultant lack of answers, is the need to separate the flesh and glory. The paradox 
is muted and the offensive nature of l: l4a is dulled if the glory (incarnation) is 
denied or if the humanity is negated. Bultmann, for example, regards the offense 
of 1: 14a--that the glory is the flesh-to be the main reason for the desire to place 
the Revealer in a costume: 
His humanity must be no more than a disguise; it must be transparent. Men 
want to look away from the humanity, and see or sense the divinity, they 
want to penetrate the disguise-or they will expect the humanity to be no 
more than the visualintion or the 'form' of the divine. 23 
In effect, if the humanity is a "disguise" then l:l4a is answered with glory, and 
conversely, if the glory is a sham then the humanity is the answer. 
Thus, throughout John-not to mention interpreters of John--Bultmann 
considers any misunderstandings to be an expression, or direct consequence, of the 
21Ibid., 66. 
21The exact nature of this question is developed in chapter two. 
23Ibid., 63 . 
11 
offence of "the word became flesh. "24 In other words, since 1: 14a yields no 
answer in the form of a didactic proposition or unmistakable glory, it is a paradox 
and offensive. Therefore, any claim upon propositions or glory is erroneous and, 
consequently, can only lead to misunderstanding. 
Kisemann and the Naive Doeetism of the Fourth Evangelist 
Kasem~ a former devoted student ofBultmann, considers it important to 
understand Bultmann's interpretation of John. More specifically, he states: 
The first thing to be said is that this interpretation [Bultmann' s interpretation 
of John] will still be studied and have influence when even the names of 
Bulnnann' s contemporary opponents are scarcely remembered. It belongs to 
the line of classic interpretations even if the fourth-form mind of our time 
does not recognize this. 25 
Nevertheless, Kasemann says that ''according to my own analysis of the structure 
of the Prologue, I must first of all say that I can no longer accept Bultmann' s 
interpretation as correctly distributing the stresses_"26 And this unacceptable stress 
2
"'Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 46. 
25Emst Kasemann, New Testament Questions ofToday, trans_ W.J . Montage 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 15-16_ 
26Ibid_, 154_ 
12 
makes~ as Kasemann comments, 1: 14a the '1Ulcrum of its exegesis"27 and 
eventually led to his break with Bultmann.28 
Kasemann considers the crap~ concept to be unable to justifY Bultmann 's 
interpretation ot: and emphasis upon, 1 :14a For Kasemann crap~ is nothing else 
than "the possibility for the Logos as the Creator and Revealer, to have 
communication with men. u 29 In effect, Kasemann considers 1: 14a to be a 
transitional point to the real theme of the Gospel, namely, 1:14c, "We beheld his 
glory.n30 It is because of the significance of the glory that Kasemann cannot 
understand why Bultmann places such a great emphasis on ''pure and simple 
humanity."31 Rather, Kasemann says "the Evangelist allows the weight of his 
propositions to fall not on 14a but on 14c.,32 Kasemann says: 
For what reason is this statement ['The Word became flesh'] almost always 
made the centre, the proper theme of the Gospel? ... we must also ask: In 
what sense is he fles~ who walks on the water and through closed doors .. . 
27Ibid., 153. 
2
'Emst Kasem~ ·~at I Have Unlearned in 50 Years as a German Theologian'' 
Currents in Theology and Mission 15 (August 1988) : 330. 





how does all this agree with the understanding of a realistic incarnation? ... 
does the statement 'The Word became flesh' really mean more than that he 
descended into the world of man and there came into contact with earthly 
existence, so that an encounter with him became possible? Is not this 
statement totally overshadowed by the confession 'We beheld his glory'?''33 
It is obvious that Kasemann's interpretation of l:l4a is contrary to Bultmann's 
since he regards the flesh as unintelligible and negligible when compared to the 
glory. 
These questions regarding the humanity of Jesus lead Kasemann-just as 
Bultmann stated would happen as a result of the offensive paradox--to allude to the 
body of Jesus as being a costume and not being subject to earthly conditions. 34 
Thus, Kasemann says, ''the disguise, the hiding, of a divine being in lowliness may 
appear paradoxical, but it is not really paradoxical at all."3~ Kasemann continues 
by commenting that "incarnation in John does not mean complete, total entry into 
the earth, into human existence, but rather the encounter between the heavenly and 
the earthly."36 
33Emst Kasemann, The Testament of Jesus: a Study of the Gospel of John in the 
Light of Chapter 17, trans. Gerhard Krodel (London: SCM Press, 1968), 9. 
34Ibid., 10. 
35Ibid., 12. 
36Ib.d 6-1 . , ::'). 
14 
This brings to light another important point, namely, Kasemann' s emphasis 
on the "encounter between the heavenly and the earthly." This comment of 
Kasemann is in contrast to Bultmann who focuses on a particular person in history. 
Kasemann says that flesh is where the Word of God is recognized, and, more 
specifically, is "creatureliness in the whole range of its possibilities. n 37 However 
cryptic "creatureliness in the whole range of possibilities" is, let it suffice to say 
that Kasemann is interested in a general humanity, not a particular person, when 
discussing the incarnation of l: l4a. 
Accordingly, Kasemann perceives Bultmann as incorrectly understanding 
the incarnation radically as an entry, of the Logos, into a "totally human life."38 
Consequently, it is obvious that Kasemann does not think the incarnation is a 
"totally human life." Bomkamm aptly comments that according to Kasemann 
"there is no trace in John of a truly human Jesus ... so in light of John 1:14 ... it 
is meaningless to speak of a genuine paradox."39 In contrast, Bultmann's position 
would be that the incarnation is a radical paradox and not an "eschatological 
37Kasem~ 1Vew Testament Questions o[Today, 158. 
3IKasemann, The Testament of Jesus, 17. 
39Giinther Bomkamm, ''Towards the Interpretation of John's Gospel: A Discussion 
of the Testament of Jesus by Ernst Kasemann," in The Interpretation of John, ed. 
J. Ashton (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) , 80. 
15 
occurrence as a process of nature by which the union of the essentially opposite 
natures ... is dissolved."40 Further, Bultmann says "according to John, the divine 
is the very counter-pole to the human, with the result that it is a paradox, an 
offense, that the Word became flesh. " 41 Thus, one could speak of Kasemann 's 
understanding as dissolving the opposites, the paradox and, consequently, the 
offense. 
Since Kasemann does not understand the flesh literally he then focuses on 
the glory and avoids the offensive nature of the paradox. He does so by avoiding 
the confrontation between the heavenly and the earthly. Kasemann states that ~'his 
[Jesus'] glory is perfected through his dea~ since his limitations cease and the 
realm of lowliness is left behind."42 Furthermore, Kasemann says, ~'his death is 
rather the manifestation of divine self-giving love and his victorious return from 
the alien realm below to the Father who had sent him."43 Kasemann notes that 
"John understands the incarnation as a projection of the glory of Jesus' pre-
existence and passion as a return to that glory cwhich was before the world 
.wBultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 40. 
~1Ibid., 41-42. 
~2Kasemann, The Testament of Jesus, 20. 
43Ib"d 1 ., 10. 
16 
began' ."44 It is obvious that Kasemann places the essential nature, so to speak, of 
Jesus within the glory and the flesh is simply a momentary privation. 45 Indeed, 
Kasemann, in contrast to Bultmann and the prevalent traditio~ 46 considers John to 
postulate a naive form of docetism. 47 
Bultmann rejects the claim that the essential Jesus, so to speak, is in the 
glory; he says that "the exalted Jesus is at the same time the earthly man Jesus; the 
'glorified one~ is still always he who 'became flesh' .. . Jesus' life on earth does 
not become an item of the historical past, but constantly remains present reality. "48 
Moreover, Bultmann comments that ''never can faith tum away from him, as if the 
'glory' --or 'truth' and 'life' --could ever become directly visible, or as if the 
Revelation consisted of a certain thought-content, and the incarnation of the 
'Word' were only a device, henceforth superfluous, for transmitting that 
44Kasemann, New Testament Questions o[Today, 20. 
~5There are obvious affinities with Gnosticism here. 
-'<>This view of Kasemann has provoked considerable debate. BomkaiiU11, speaking 
for the 'Old Marburgers,' notes that "even from the point of view of history the 
thesis that the Christology of John is naively docetic seems to me to be false." G. 
Bomkamm, "Towards the Interpretation of John's Gospel/' 92. 
~7Kasema.nn. The Testament of Jesus, 26. 
"'
8Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament~ 49. 
17 
content. "49 Once again Bulnnann insists on the necessity of a particular person 
and history that is found only in the flesh and is not a momentary sojourn into the 
"alien realm." 
Nevertheless, Kasemann disagrees with his former mentor Bultmann and 
says that "what is to be proclaimed and should be taken with utmost seriousness is 
the Nazerene's path to world lordship."~0 According to Kisemann l:l4a is 
insignificant when compared with l : 14c. Flesh is subsumed under the glory and 
the paradox and offense are eradicated. It is then ironic, in light of Kasemann' s 
emphasis of the glory and lordship, in opposition to Bultmann' s flesh and passion, 
that Ashton says: 
Bultmann's severely uncompromising christology is not substantial enough 
to stand up to the attacks [of] Kasemann [since] the humanity of Jesus is 
itself altogether too scrawny and spindly to stand a fighting chance against 
the power and the glory ofKasemann's 'iiber die Erde schreitender Gott' 
(God striding over the earth). 51 
Is it not the very glory that Kasemann emphasizes that reduces the humanity of 
Jesus to a momentary disguise? The humanity of Jesus appears more spindly in 
Kasemann' s view than in Bulnnann' s. Bulttnann would likely attribute this 
"
9Ibid., 73 . 
5
°Kasemann, '~at I have Unlearned in 50 Years as a German Theologian," 331. 
51 Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel, 66. 
comment of Ashton7 S to the paradoxical nature of 1:14a which has led, and will 
lea~ to many misunderstandings in interpreting 1:14a. 
Conclusion: the Significance of .John 1:14a 
18 
The difference between BuJtmann and Kasemann in regard to 1:14a has 
been shown to be most pointed in reference to the emphasis on the flesh or glory 
respectively. This distinction is important for continued study of Bultmann since 
1: l4a is the paradigm of his hermeneutical method. In fact, the paradoxical and 
offense nature of his interpretation of 1: 14a-and perhaps the misunderstandings 
that arise from being paradoxical-carries through into his historical thought. 
Note the similarity between Bultmann' s notion of 1: 14a and his historical 
vtew. He says that "the community which speaks is not constituted by an idea and 
by eternal norms7 but by a concrete history and its tradition.n52 For Bultmann both 
the Revealer and history are concrete, in contrast to Kasemann for whom the 
revealer is a general mode. Thus7 "the paradox is that the word of Jesus does not 
find its substantiation by a backward movement from the attesting word to the 
thing attested-as it might if the thing itself were confirmable irrespective of the 
52J3ultm~ The Fourth Gospe/7 70. 
19 
word-but finds it only in a faith-prompted acceptance of the word."53 
Furthermore, Bultmann defines the paradox thus: 
Jesus is a human, historical person ... his work and destiny happened within 
world-history and as such come under the scrutiny of the historian who can 
understand them as part of the nexus ofhistory. Nevertheless, such detached 
historical inquiry cannot become aware of what God has wrought in Christ, 
that is, of the eschatological event "54 
In contrast to Bultm~ Kasemann says, "I learned to regard the question 
of the meaning of universal history as the key to the problem of existence and as 
the centre of the New Testament."55 This centre, for Kasemann, blends together 
the universal history and the glory and lordship of Jesus. In fact, Kasemann's 
view of the non-paradoxical nature of the flesh and glory leads to his 
understanding of a universal history, while Bultmann 's view of the paradoxical 
nanrre of the flesh and glory leads to his conception of the problem of historical 
investigation. 
53Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 69. 
5
"Rudolf Bulttnann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1958) , 80. 
ssKasemann, '~What I have Unlearned," 329-330. 
20 
Kasemann considers an understanding of history to be important to afford a 
better understanding ofBulhnann .s6 Yet just as .Kasemann could not accept 
Bultmann' s paradoxical interpretation of 1: 14a he also does not accept his 
historical view. He states,. "I simply do not understand the extraordinary radical 
antithesis of historical and material continuity . . . . "s1 For example,. in light of 
Bultmann's insistence on the flesh, it is important to note that he comments,. 
concerning historical investigations in the life of Jesus, that·~ calmly let the fire 
b~ for I see that what is consumed is only the fanciful portraits of Life-of-Jesus 
theology, and that means nothing other than 'Christ after the flesh' ... how things 
looked in the heart of Jesus I do not know and do not want to know."s8 
This statement raises an interesting question: just what is the historical view 
of Bultmann if on the one hand he is intent on a definite historical person, yet on 
the other allows that very history to ''bum"? It is evident that there is a radical 
antithesis in Bultmann' s interpretation of 1: 14a by emphasizing the radical 
discontinuity between flesh and glory and in his historical method. Consequently, 
56Emst Kasemann, Essays on New Testament Themes, trans. W.J. Montague 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 16. 
57Kasemann, New Testament Questions ofToday, 36. 
5SSultmann, Faith and Undentanding, 132. 
21 
Bultmann 's interpretation of l: 14a is paradoxical and offensive and does not 
afford didactic propositions or universal ideas to grasp; it is also analogous to his 
historical view, in so far as both his interpretation of 1: 14a and his historical view 
posit what Kasemann would call a "radical antithesis." 
The next question to be asked, then, is "what is Bultmann 's view of 
history?" A discussion ofBultmann 's view of history not only follows well after 
the preliminary discussion of 1: l4a as the paradigm of his thought, but continues 
to develop that very interpretation itself in the fashion of the hermeneutical circle 
toward a better understanding of his method. 
CHAPTER2 
IDS TORY AND THEOLOGY IN BUL TMANN'S mOUGHT 
Bultmann~s interpretation of John l:l4a is based in the paradoxical identity 
of flesh and glory in spite of the radical discontinuity between the two. This 
paradoxical interpretation of 1:14a, as the paradigmatic basis ofBultmann's 
hermeneutical metho~ carries into his investigation of history. More specifically, 
the paradox finds expression in Bultmann's historical thought in his insistence on 
historical research and his simultaneous rejection of the results of historical 
research. Bultmann states that •csince the New Testament is a document of 
history, specifically of the history of religion, the interpretation of it requires the 
labor of historical investigation. " 59 Yet he is not disturbed if the discoveries of 
historical investigations are '1>umed" to the ground. 60 
This paradox in Bultmann's conception of historical research, which both 
affirms and negates historical study, follows from Bultmann's understanding of 
59Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 25l. 
60Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, 132. 
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1: 14a Simply put, he thinks that the event of the Word becoming flesh is an 
historical fact, yet he is sceptical about the importance of the recovery of the past 
particulars ofhistory. More specifically, he considers l:l4a to be an actual event 
in history in which the Word became a man with a history, yet he also denies that 
1: 14a is simply an historical event that can be remembered. ot. Indeed, Bultmann 
admits that he creates a paradox. He states that "the paradox is the claim that a 
historical event [John l:14a] is at the same time the eschatological event."62 Just 
as Bultmann considers 1: 14a to be a paradox by joining the divine and flesh, he 
also considers it a paradox to join eschatology (the 'Wholly Other') with a specific 
historic event. 
To understand Bulnnann' s conception of the relationship between 
eschatology and history it is necessary first to discuss his understanding of history. 
Bultmann' s historical understanding is admittedly complex; however, he says it is 
actually ••extremely simple . .. [but] of course the understanding of simple things 
can be difficult, but such difficulty is due not to the nature of things but to the fact 
that we have forgotten how to see directly, being too much burdened with 
61Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 162. 
62Ibid., 163. 
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presuppositions. "63 And as we shall see,. presuppositions are the important 
contingent factor-other than the historical fact-when investigating history, and 
they determine the complex (yet simple?) historicaltmderstanding ofBultmann 
The Problem of History for Bultmann 
The problem of historical studies, according to Bultmann, is the continual 
attempt to eliminate subjectivity, in pursuit of assumed objectivity, and the 
avoidance of the question of what historical facts are.64 It is thereby apparent that 
Bultmann rejects a neutral standpoint from which history can be an object of study, 
and argues that any objective historical facts are not sufficient for understanding 
history. In fact, according to Bultmann, there is no neutral standpoint from which 
to determine history and guarantee an objective approach. He says that "the 
historian himself stands within history and partakes of it ... he cannot take a stand 
outside history at an 'Archimedean point', "65 primarily because there is no 
universal world history which would require an "Archimedean point" 
63RudolfBultmann, Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) , 15. 
64Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), 78. 
6Slbid., 127. 
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perspective. 66 In other words, not only is an "Archimedean point" impossible, but 
there is no use for such a perspective since there is no universal world history 
either. 
Since there is no uArchimedean point" from which to investigate history 
there is always a particular view-point, question and/or methodology that the 
interpreter brings to historical investigation. Bultmann says that ''each 
interpretation is guided by a certain interest, by a certain putting of the question. 7767 
The view-point, question, and/or methodology that the interpreter brings to 
interpretation is a result of the basic fact, as Bulnnann says, that the "seeing of 
history is itself an historical event."68 Moreover, Bultmann says that one "cannot 
observe this complex [history] objectively .. . for in every word he says about 
history he is saying at the same time something about himself ... there cannot be 
an impersonal observation ofhistory."69 
Because there is no escape from history itself to enable one to take an 




69Sultmann, Jesus and the Word, 3. 
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The demand that the interpreter has to silence his or her subjectivity and 
quench any individuality in order to achieve objective knowledge could not 
be more absurd. It makes sense and is justified only insofar as it means that 
the intetpreter must silence his or her personal wishes with respect to the 
results of the intetpretation .... 70 
Even if one could escape one's own subjectivity one would never be able to escape 
the subjectivity of method. n Moreover, Bultmann says that ''every interpretation 
of history presupposes a hermeneutic method."72 
The problem that Bultmann thus sees in historical studies is the forgetting 
of the impossibility of an" Archimedean point." Consequently, historical 
investigations often lead to problems of method such as "the historical pantheism 
of liberal theology [which is] a murky mixture of romantic and idealist motifs.'713 
More specifically, he considers any method that posits data in such an 
Archimedean fashion, to interpret or reconstruct eschatological history, to lead to a 
number of errors--such as an Hegelian idealistic interpretation, a naturalistic 
(materialistic) interpretation or a psychological (history-of-religions school) 
70Bultm~ New Testament and Mythology, 85. 
71Bultm~ Jesus and the Word, 5. 
'93ultm~ The Presence of Eternity, 110. 
73RudolfBultmann, What is Theology?, ed. EberhardJiingelandKlaus W. MUller 
trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 87. 
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interpretation. 7" Bulnnann considers such historical methods to be reductive 
systems which fain an "Arcbimedean point'' and make the assumption of knowing 
God through history into a pantheism of history. 7s These methods cannot grasp 
history, only their own methods. 
The prime tool used by Bultmann to critique the reduction of God to 
historical investigations--the pantheism of history-is the Logos, which Bultmann 
considers to be its stumbling block.76 Hence, l:l4a is of prime importance in 
understanding Bultmann' s historical understanding. The underlying concept for 
Bultmann in regard to 1:14a as applied to history is the tension between 
eschatology and history. It is this tensio~ and as will be shown this paradoxical 
union, that delineates Bultmann' s historical understanding. 
Bulttnann states that: 
The Christ occurrence means the eschatological occurrence through which 
God has put an end to the world and its history. Therefore, this paradox is 
7~Bultmann, "The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament," in 
Rudolf Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the Modem Era, ed. Roger A. Johnson 
~eapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 130. 
75Bulttnann, Faith and Understanding, 32f. See also Bultmann, Jesus and the 
Word, 5. 
76Bulttnann, Faith and Understanding, 35 
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the claim that a historical event is at the same time the eschatological event.77 
Furthermore~ Bultmann says that in John "eschatology as a time-perspective has 
dropped out because he has so radically transposed eschatological occUITence into 
the present ... he sees the peculiar paradoxical tension."71 More specifically~ 
Bultmann adds that the paradox is that the Logos-as the eschatological event-is 
not capable of historical proof, yet the person Jesus is in the nexus ofhistory.79 
Further, Bultmann says that "God's eschatological act takes place in history,. in the 
fact that 'the word became flesh' .''80 Even more explicitly, Bulnnann says that 
••the eschatological now ... is strictly bound to the 'Word became tlesh'.''81 This 
is analogous to the Word which is both flesh and divine at the same time. In other 
words, l:l4a is a paradox in the nature of the person Jesus (flesh in union with 
divine) and in reference to history (historic event in union with eschatology), the 
latter of each binary in the union being incapable of objective verification. 
7
'13ultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 163. 
7SSultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 19 
79jjultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 80. 
80Bultmann, New TestamentandMythology, 61. 
81Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, 175. 
29 
It is thereby apparent that Bultmann understands and accepts the historic 
event of the "\Vord became flesh." Yet at the same time Bultmann says that "for 
Jo~ from beginning to en~ Jesus is not meant to be the 'historical Jesus'; he is 
the 'Word~, and with this 'Word' history begins now."82 This tension between the 
historic event, the present, and eschatology is summarized by Bultrnann: "the now 
of 'the Word became flesh' is always present in the now of the proclamation, in 
the moment. "83 Thus Bultmann says of the Word that it can be, and is, spoken of 
in the aorist and the perfect and therefore Jesus is present through proclamatio~ 
not reconstruction. 84 The historic event of 1: 14a is made present in its 
eschatological union through proclamation. An example of the proclamation, 
according to Bultmann, is found in the words "we have beheld his glocy'' by which 
the historic event is made contemporary; when the "Word" is proclaimed the 
"eschatological now stands over every present."8s The paradoxical union for 
Bultmann is that the Logos is the "once for all" and also an historical event. 86 




86Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 82. 
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It is now apparent that Bultmann 's understanding of history is far from a 
basic reconstruction of historical facts. Since Bultmann is not using the building 
blocks of historical events he criticizes the method of objective historical research, 
along with the human reason that assumes it is mounted on an "Archimedean 
point" when trying to interpret "the Word became flesh." It is true, according to 
Bultm~ that the historical event can be viewed historically in the sense of 
chronology, but exclusive use of chronology is not an interpretation. John l:l4a 
can be interpreted solely as the historical birth of Jesus, but exclusive 
chronological data, according to Bultmann, miss the significance of the historical 
fact of the divine. 
Thus far a critique of objective historical inquiry has been discussed by 
placing an emphasis on the nature and role of presuppositions, but the question still 
remains, "what is Bultmann's historical method?" 
Historie and Geschichte in Bultmann 's Thought 
Bultmann raises the question of the possibility of objective historical 
knowledge if interpretation is not objective or from an "Archimedean point."17 
From the previous discussion of the problem of history it would appear that 
87Bultm~ The Presence of Eternity, liS. 
Bultmann is excessively critical of objective historical study and would deny the 
possibility of any objective historical knowledge. This would suggest that his 
method leads to scepticism and/or confusion since he maintains that we cannot 
know history through objective chronological data In fact, the question may be 
legitimately raised: ''Does Bultmann even have an historical method?" 
It is necessary to dig deeper before we reject Bultmann as a sceptic or 
muddled philosopher. In spite of the lack of a neutral standpoint from which to 
study history there is chronological data of the life of Jesus, and this data is 
surprisingly significant for Bultmann. 
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Bultmann does not simply rest upon sceptical grounds alone by rejecting 
historical methods; rather, his critique of history is a critique of the method of 
objective historical research more than historical data per se. Bultmann says that 
"there can be no question of discarding historical criticism. " 88 Also, "since the 
New Testament is a document of history, specifically of the history of religion, the 
interpretation of it requires the labour of historical investigation. "89 Such 
8SSultmann, Faith and Understanding, 31. 
8~ultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 251. 
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investigation necessitates an historical method. 90 Hence, his whole study is based 
on understanding the historical context of the text within the historical-critical and 
history-of-religion schools.91 For Bultmann "God is the God ofhistory."92 
This leaves a question that Bulttnann raises,. namely,. if objective historical 
knowledge is possiblet and necessary, then is history sufficiently seen?93 In other 
words, after discrediting the objective study of history with all its inherent 
problems, as discussed earlier, then how is history seen through the problems? 
Bultmann seems,. on the one hand, to be very critical of history, and yet on the 
other to embrace it. To ease this dualistic tension between the problem of history 
and the use ofbistory, or conversely between the observer of history and historical 
facts, Bultmann posits two modes of historical understanding: historie and 
geschichte. This distinction is the key to understanding Bultmann's simultaneous 
rejection and use of historical investigation. 
90Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, trans. Schubert M. Ogden (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), 291. 
91Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 250. 
93ulttnann, The Presence ofEtemity, 96. 
93Ibid., l17. 
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The distinction between historie and geschichte is explained as follows by 
Bultmann: "The goal of history [histone] is not an eschatological future but is the 
historical process itself.'~ Despite the fact that the historical Jesus cannot be 
known through the text or objective da~ Bultmann still states that "the revealer 
appears as a definite human being in history: Jesus ofNazareth. " 9s Geschichte, 
however, unlike histone, cannot be reduced to casual connections or 
psychologism; rather, it is the interpretation of the observer regarding natural 
events in relation to one's life. Indeed, Bultmann states, ·~history [geschichte] as 
the field of human actions cannot, however, be cut off from nature and natural 
events."96 For example, "as the salvation occurrence, then, the cross of Christ is 
not a mythical event but an historical (geschichtliche) occurrence that has its origin 
in the historical (historische) event of the crucifixion of Jesus ofNazareth."97 It 
follows that the chronological events of Jesus' life, for example, are necessary, but 
not sufficient, for geschichte--which itself requires the subjectivity of the observer. 
This is the difference between Bultmann and the traditional historical approach of 
94Bultmann, The Presence o[Etemity, 68. 
95Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 41. 
96Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 139. 
97Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 35. 
the historical-critic and the history-of-religions school since he emphasizes the 
subjectivity of the observer in contrast to the objective study itself.98 
Consequently, Bultmann' s theory leads to the conclusion that geschichte is 
dependent on historie, but historie alone can only yield objective idols and is the 
base problem of assumed objectivity in historical interpretation. 
Bu1tmann' s use of geschichte and historie leaves the tension of the 
subjective (interpreter's subjectivity) and objective (historical facts), without 
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siding with one or the other. This tension, however, is itself misplaced for 
Bultm.ann since he considers the subject/object relation of classical science, which 
maintains a separation between the subject and object, to be of no value for 
historical science which must not hold such a distinction between the subject and 
object.99 Bultmann states that "it needs to become clear that the genuine relation 
of historians to history cannot be understood according to the traditional scheme of 
the relation of subject to object."100 Since Bultmann emphasizes both the 
subjective interpretation and the objective data he comments that "the most 
subjective interpretation is the most objective, because the only person who is able 
98Bultm~ New Testament Theology, vol. 2, 252. 
99Bultm~ The Presence o[Etemity, 133. 
100Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 137. 
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to hear the claim of the text is the person who is moved by the question of his or 
her own existence."tot This paradoxical statement is amplified by Bultmann's 
comment that objective history is only understood subjectively. 102 This assertion 
of Bultmann is seemingly contradictory,. but it is only contradictory if one 
interprets it through the traditional scheme of the subject/object relation. Thus, the 
only way to understand Bulnnann is to investigate his own pre-understanding. 
Bultmann states that: 
The point then is not to eliminate the pre-understanding but to risk it, to raise 
it to the level of consciousness, and to test it critically in understanding the 
text. In short, in questioning the text one must allow one-self to be 
questioned by the text and to give heed to its claim.103 
He comments in another context that being: 
Deeply disturbed by the problem of our own life is therefore the 
indispensable condition of our inquiry. Then the examination of history will 
lead not to the enrichment of timeless wisdom, but to an encounter with 
history which itself is an event in time. This is dialogue with history.104 
101Bu1tmann, The Presence of Etemity, 122. See also Bultmann, New Testament 
andMythology, 138f. 
102Sultmann, Existence and Faith, 294. 
103Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 84. 
104Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, ll-12. 
36 
Objective historical research necessarily entails historical da~ but it is through 
subjectivity that questions are ask~ and it is through these questions that history 
is seen as geschichte_Los Thus, Bulnnann maintains that if one is aware of one~s 
own pre-understanding (subjectivity) then objectivity is possible.L06 
Nevertheless, the question will be raised: "does Bultmann 's method really 
end with objectivity through subjectivity?" If Bulbnann rejects assumed objective 
historical research as historie alone, but uses historical research through 
geschichte, which places a great emphasis upon the interpreter's subjectivity, then 
it must be the case that his method leads to solipsism or subjectivism. His method 
must be one of subjectivism since pre-understanding is so important. Bultmann's 
dialogue with history must only be a dialogue with oneself. 
Bultmann, however, reacts as strongly against unfettered subjectivism as he 
does against assumed objectivity. He says that "genuine freedom is not subjective 
arbitrariness ... the freedom of subjective arbitrariness is a delusion."107 
Bultmann considers such subjective arbitrariness to Lead to nowhere but relativism 
105Bultm~ The Presence of Eternity, 119. 
106Bultmann, Existence and Faith, 64. 
107Bultm~ Jesus Christ and Mythology, 41. 
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and nihilism.101 Bultmann comments, regarding the interpreter's decision, that "it 
does not arise by a man's wavering in. his security and getting bewildered at the 
world and so turning away from it to waft himself up into a world beyond by 
speculative thought or devout silence~ " 109 It should be clear that Bultmann will 
notacceptthelabelofsubjectivist. 
So we see that BulbDann 's method is not intent on a radical scepticism of 
silence or a thought project of subjectivism taking comfort in a solipsistic world; 
neither is he an historicist or an objectivist. Bultmann is not intent on negating the 
objectification of histocy, but rather wants to negate any exclusive claim for the 
objectification of history that excludes the subjectivity of the interpreter and 
consequently geschichte. 
The guiding question of the problem of histocy and the use of histocy in 
Bultmann's method ends in contradictocy confusion if it is interpreted within a 
traditional schema of the subject/object relation, but if Bultmann' s understanding 
of history is investigated further it leads to a mutual and necessary dialectical 
101Ibid., 42. 
109Sultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 76. 
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relationship between subject and object. uo And this relationship is analogous to 
the initial investigation of 1: 14a. 
Bultmann's Theology and His Demythologizing Project 
The above investigation ofBultmann~s historical method leads us naturally 
to his use of demythologizing. Bultmann states: 
This method of interpretation of the New Testament which 
tries to recover the deeper meaning behind the mythological 
conceptions I call de-mythologizing-an unsatisfactory wor~ 
to be sure. Its aim is not to eliminate the mythological 
statements but to interpret them. It is a method of 
hermeneutics.111 
This "unsatisfactory wor~" demythologizing, is the summation ofBultmann's 
method. Indee~ Bultmann' s tas~ to discover the method by which we can 
interpret 1: 14~ is at last found in demythologizing. The term itself does not arise 
out of thin air; rather, it is the synthetic composite ofBultmann's historical study 
and theological understanding. 
Bultmann considers the method of demythologizing to be an imperative 
hermeneutic today and justifies its use as it was also necessary for the writing of 
110Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 158. 
msultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 18. 
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John. He states~ '~demythologizing has its beginning in the New Testament itself, 
and therefore our task of demythologizing today is justified."112 More specifically, 
Bulnnann states that '~John demythologized the eschatology in a radical 
manner_"u3 In other words, the only way of expressing the other-worldly is 
through myth; consequently~ the eschatological preaching of Jesus is retained and 
continued by the early Christian community in mythological form, but is 
demythologized by John.. 11"' Demythologizing is necessary since "the 
transcendence of God is not made immanent as it is in myth; rather, the paradox of 
the presence of the transcendent God in history is affirmed: 'the word became 
flesh' ."lls Without demythologizing the other-worldly is left with worldly 
objectivity, u6 and then the historical problem returns of reducing 1: 14a to a 
chronology of the life of Jesus. The problem is that "myths give worldly 




"Ibid., 3 l. 
usBultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 42. 
u 6Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 19. 
117Ibid., 19. 
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To reject a demythologizing hermeneutic is to deny either relativistic 
world-views, or to deny meaning to mythological elements in the Bible, whereas to 
accept it is to say that the revelation in the Bible is not historically determined by a 
world-view, but is found in many world-views. And if it is found in many world-
views it is important that revelation not be lost in the archaic myths of any one 
world-view. 
It was shown previously that it is easy to interpret Bultmann' s method as 
subjectivism, and now it would be easy to interpret his demythologizing method as 
a rational destruction of myth. However, it is important to note that Bultmann says 
that "to demythologize is not to reject Scripture or the Christian message as a 
whole, but the world-view of Scripture ____ .. us Thus, Bultmann is not originating 
a rational view point that destroys the mystery of God, but rather he considers his 
method to maintain the mystery of God.119 Further, Bultmann states that ~~its 
[demythologizing] criticism of the biblical writings lies not in eliminating 
mythological statements but in interpreting them; it is not a process of subtraction 
but a hermeneutical method."120 
ll8Ibid., 35. 
119Ibid., 43 . 
120Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 99. 
41 
To further understand Bultmann~ s demythologizing it is useful to look at his 
comparison of demythologizing with theology. He comments: 
In point of fact, radical demythologizing is the parallel to the Pauline-
Lutheran doctrine of justification through faith alone without works of the 
law. Or, rather, it is the consistent application of this doctrine to the field of 
knowledge. Like the doctrine of justificatio~ it destroys every false security 
and every false demand for security .. .. 121 
This destruction of security, according to Bultm~ will raise anxiety. He notes 
that: 
Anxiety about demythologizing may be due in part to the unquestioned 
assumption that there is an either/or between mythology and science~ where 
by 'science' is understood the science that objectifies existence into being 
within the world ... (but] on the contrary demythologizing wants an 
understanding of scripture that is free of every world picture projected by 
objectifying thinking, whether it is that of myth or that of science.122 
This assumed either/or between myth or science is analogous to the either/or of 
flesh/divinity and that of subject' object. Bultmann makes it clear that his method 
of interpreting John 1: 14a is not to discover the solitary truth; rather~ it is to 
continue the discussion regarding the interpretation of John 1: 14a. This continued 
discussion of John 1:14~ or dialogue with history, stops once myth, science~ 
objective historical research, or subjectivism is considered as absolute. This is the 
121Ibid.~ 122. 
122Ibid., 10 1 f. 
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problem that Bultmann wants to avoid in his method of demythologizing. Yet this 
understanding is not readily apparent if an interpreter of Bultmann approaches the 
study with a pre-understanding which makes myth, science, objectivity or 
subjectivity absolute. Since Bultmann will not admit to an either/or between the 
above distinctions there is a paradox in his method. Bultmann admits to this 
paradox: in his research which requires the text of 1: 14a, yet at the same time must 
be critical of the text. t!3 
This continual interplay of interpretation and the text is very similar to post-
structuralist thought. More specifically, l:l4a as the paradigmatic cornerstone of 
Bultmann' s hermeneutical method has led from a. discussion of Christo logy, to 
historical studies including hermeneutical methods, to the basis of Bultmann' s 
method, namely, an anti-Cartesian hermeneutic wbich is very critical of either/or 
categories that could accept as absolute myth, science, object or subject. It is 




JOHN l:l4aANDBULTMANN'S THOUGHT AS ANTI-
CARTESIAN 
Bultmann's interpretation of John l: 14a has been shown to rest in a 
paradox. His affirmation of the paradoxical union of the opposites flesh and 
divinity (glory) was in contrast to his best known student Kasemann who sees the 
emphasis fall upon the glmy, and who thus diminishes the paradox. Bultmann, 
moreover, asserts that the Revealer only reveals that he is the Revealer. He states 
that "Jesus as the Revealer of God reveals nothing but that he is the Revealer."12" 
Hence, l: l4a leads Bultmann to his paradoxical interpretation of the union of 
opposites in the revealer, and to the paradox of the Revealer not revealing any 
specific knowledge or wisdom other than that he is the revealer. 
Since nothing other than the event of 1:14a (6 Aoyoc; oci:p~ eyeve-ro) is 
revealed it would. seem that historical research on that definite person would be of 
paramount importance for Bultmann. To this end Bultmann does make use of the 
historical-critical method, the method of liberal theology. He states that "since the 
mBulnn~ Theology of the New Testament, 66. 
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New Testament is a document of history . . . the interpretation of it requires the 
labor of historical investigation."l25 In fact, Bultmann is sometimes considered 
(mistakenly) to be a Liberal theologian.126 
However, despite the value Bulhnann places on the historical-critical 
method he renounces any foundational claim that could be made from the 
historical-critical method. He acknowledges that liberal theology does offer 
certain insights, yet he remains critical of its methods, such as historical-critical 
investigations.127 The goal of liberal theology, for example, to find through 
historical criticism the personality of Jesus as the ground of faith, is rejected by 
Bultmann. Despite the fact that Bultmann insists on a definite human being in 
history, and that no knowledge other than 1:14a (that the Word became flesh) is 
given, Bultmann, nevertheless, lets history "burn."l28 Thus, as was seen in chapter 
two, not only is the element of paradox of paramount importance for Bultmann in 
the interpretation of 1: 14a with respect to the union of flesh and divinity, it also is 
125Ibid., 25 L 
126Reginald H. Fuller, The New Testament in Cu"ent Study (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1962), 1 L 
127W alter Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann 
(London: SCM Press, 1967), 12f. 
128Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, 132. 
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inherent in his simultaneous confirmation and rejection of historical interpretation. 
Bultmann posits an historical event and definite person, but lets that history-of the 
historical Jesus-"bum." Bultmann maintains that "historical research can never 
lead to any result which could serve as a basis for fai~ for all its results have only 
relative validity ... here research ends with a large question mark-and here it 
ought to end_nL29 
It is not surprising, then, with paradox being of such primary importance in 
Bultmann's thought, and his seemingly negative view of history and interpretation 
which constitutes demythologizing, that Bultmann has many critics, and is often 
misunderstood. 130 If 1: l4a reveals nothing other than the Word became flesh, and 
the historical element that this entails is inaccessible or "burned, n then negation 
seems the only alternative, apparently leaving the interpreter with subjectivism. 
Thielicke, for instance, regards Bultmann's use of demythologizing as a project of 
129Jbid., 30. 
1300ther critics of Bultmann include, for instance, Hans Joachim Iwand who 
"believed that he had detected 'signs of senility' in the author [Bultmann].n Also, 
a circulated pamphlet in 1951 was of the opinion that demythologizing was a 
"poison." See Karl-JosefKusche~ Born Before All Time (London: SCM Press, 
1992), 154, 159. 
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negation and subjectivism.131 However, although demythologizing does not 
produce any concept or knowledge it does not therefore follow that 
demythologizing is nothing other than a method ending in nmiJism and/or 
subjectivism. 
It is the ingrained influence of Cartesian thought which forces this illusory 
choice between Bultmann the historical-critic or Bultmann the subjectivist and 
thereby misrepresents Bultmann's thought entirely. Here it is instructive to 
compare Bultmann' s paradoxical interpretation of 1: l4a, which has forced many to 
this false dichotomy, with post-structuralism. Yet it is an uneasy comparison. It 
would be exceedingly naive to equate Bulnnann with post-structuralism, yet it 
would be negligent not to note the distinct similarity and effective dialogue that 
may proceed from such a comparison. 
One argument which would suggest a dissociation of Bultmann from post-
structuralism would be that post-structuralism entails an entirely open-ended 
intexpretation which is incompatible with Bultmann's hermeneutic. And it might 
conversely be said that Bultmann's demythologizing and post-structuralism are 
similar in that both are subjectivistic and negating. However, neither of these 
mHelmut Thielicke, "The Restatement of New Testament Mythology, "in 
Kerygma and Myth: a Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, trans. 
Reginald H. Fuller (London: S.P.C.K., 1953), 147. 
47 
criticisms stand up to close scrutiny. A discussion of Derrida and deconstruction 
(as a particular example of post-structuralism) reveals the inaccuracy of attributing 
an antithesis~ or synthesis,. between Bultmann and deconstruction on the basis of 
negation and indetenninacy. It will be argued that neither Bultmann through 
demythologizing, nor Derrida through deconstructio~ necessarily lead to negation 
and indeterminacy. In fact, the argument that both Bulnnann and deconstruction 
are nihilistic is a misleading generalization. 
Once demythologizing and deconstruction are free from the charge of 
nihilism and subjectivis~ then they can be fruitfully contrasted with Cartesian-
based interpretation. Cartesian interpretation is, in fact, the stance against which 
both Bultmann and Derrida are reacting. It follows that liberal theology~ as a 
particular method that is closely allied to Cartesianis~ will necessarily have a 
difficult time when discussing demythologizing. 
This parallel anti-Cartesian thought of Bultmann and post-structuralism 
points to a renewed possibility of effective dialogue with Bultmann' s thought, 
avoiding the Cartesian error of positing the false choice between Bultmann the 
historical-critic or Bultmann the subjectivist. It is time to revisit Bultmann from a 
perspective other than Cartesianism, which has often left Bultmann misunderstood. 
As Kuschel expresses, 44Bulttnann' s demythologizing programme must be thought 
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through again today. " 132 This new perspective can be found in post-structuralism, 
and it is a promising path to a renewed understanding of demythologizing and 
Bultmann' s anti-Cartesian hermeneutic. 
We began with a discussion of Bultmann' s distinctive interpretation of John 
1: 14a and now we must return to that. The real significance of Bultmann' s 
hermeneutic is found in his understanding of 1:14a. Bultmann's hermeneutic is a 
result of his interpretation of the verse, and not a mere trend in philosophical 
currents, as is perhaps the case in some post-structural hermeneutics. Furthermore, 
the principle working within demythologizing is not a variant of post-
structuralism, but will be shown to be the theological principle of justification by 
faith. Nevertheless, we will venture into Cartesianism and post-structuralism, 
specifically Derrida' s deconstruction, in order to clarify the very significant nature 
of 1: 14a in Bultmann' s thought. The goal is a clarification of Bultmann' s thought, 
not a reduction of his thought to another philosophy or person. 133 
132Kuschel, Born Before All Time?, 161. 
133Schmithals, similarly, is not concerned with the historical development of 
Bultmann' s thought, but in understanding the major themes in his thought. See 
Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology ofRudolfBultmann, 20. 
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A Cartesian Context 
Rather than rushing to the defense ofBultmann, or his critics, it is useful to 
first examine the root of the problem as to why Bultmann is criticized, and the 
presuppositions of those very criticisms. The negative criticisms ofBultmann's 
hermeneutical method-demythologizing-arise, in fact, as a result of viewing 
demythologizing from a Cartesian perspective. 
Cartesianism, as the term implies, is connected to Descartes' thought. 
Adam states that: 
One of the pivotal moments of modernity came when Rene Descartes 
realized that he could not doubt his own existence; from this, he rebuilt the 
whole metaphysical superstructure of Western philosophy with this one 
axiom as his foundation. Whatever one's foundation, the philosophical 
tradition has customarily assumed that one needed to have some undoubtable, 
unshakeable truth with which to back up one's theoretical claims. 134 
The thought of Descartes explicitly reveals the essential foundation which is 
undoubtable, namely, the self. Sarup notes, "Consider the phrase: 'I think, 
therefore I am.' Descartes's 'I' assumes itself to be fully conscious, and hence 
self-knowable. It is not only autonomous but coherent . . . In his work Descartes 
offers us a narrator who imagines that he speaks without simultaneously being 
l:W A.K.M. Adam, What is Postmodem Biblical Criticism? (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1995) , 5f. 
so 
spoken." 13s With such a Cartesian foundation the self is, as Phillips notes, the 
only certainty and is conceived of as separate from the body.136 
Since the thinking self is the foundation of Cartesianism it follows that 
there are separate objects that are thought upon. Thiselton notes this distinction by 
defining Cartesianism as a method that posits an "active subject [who] scrutinizes 
the things around him as passive objects."137 Madison continues this distinction 
between the thinking subject and the objects thought upon in his description of the 
dualistic nature of Cartesianism and the result of this dualism is the alienation of 
subject and object 138 
The Cartesian distinction between the self and the object of study develops 
into a hermeneutic of its o~ as Bernstein notes: 
Basic dichotomies between the subjective and the objective; the conception 
of knowledge as being a correct representation of what is objective; the 
13sMadan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodemism 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1993), L 
136D.Z. Phillips, '"At the Mercy of Method," in Philosophy and the Grammar of 
Religious Belief, ed. Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1995), 6. 
137 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980), 299. 
mG. B. Madison, The Hermeneutics ofPostmodemity (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 58. 
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conviction that human reason can completely free itself of bias, prejudice, 
and tradition; the ideal of a universal method by which we can first secure 
firm foundations of knowledge and then build the edifice of a universal 
science; the belief that by the power of self-reflection we can transcend our 
historical context and horizon and know things as they really are in 
themselves.139 
This Cartesian framework of thought leads to a Cartesian hermeneutic. As Bruns 
describes: 
Since the power of reason is equally distributed in all human beings, 
interpretive authority belongs to everyone-so long as he or she approaches 
the text in a carefuL impartiaL and unfettered spirit, making no assumptions 
concerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines except those which can be 
perceived clearly and distinctly in the light of natural reason. Call this 
Cartesian hermeneutics ... in which the text comes under the control of the 
reader as disengaged rational subject, unresponsive except to its own self-
certitude. t.w 
It is this Cartesian hermeneutic that is pervasive in Western thought and thereby 
also in hermeneutics, and it is for this reason that Bultmann has endured critical 
and misguided reviews of his demythologizing. 
Martin Rumscheidt considers a Cartesian hermeneutic to be analogous to 
liberal theology and comments that '''liberal theology', as a scholarly discipline, 
13%chard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 
36. 
140Gerald L. Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), 149. 
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and ~liberal' faith, as a faith that knows, are 'modem' since they embrace the 
Cartesian assertion that to be hmnan at all is to be about the enterprise of cognitive 
appropriation of reality."141 Harnack, for whom the picture of the historical Jesus 
is essential to the Christian faith as an objective ''Archimedean point," is an 
example ofliberal theology. Harnack sought the timeless truth(the ethical life) of 
Christianity through historical criticism in What is Christianity? He was 
concerned, for example, with cognitive constructions of God in contrast to the 
"wholly other" stumbling block of God epitomized in John 1:14a.142 
If traditional methods of interpreting Bultmann are rooted in a Cartesian 
hermeneutic, then it is obvious that they will have difficulty discussing Bultmann's 
demythologizing as it stands outside of a Cartesian evaluative framework, such as, 
for example, liberal theology. w Bultmann' s hermeneutic, being anti-Cartesian, is 
consequently better discussed in a post-structural context. 
1~1Martin Rumscheidt, ed., Adolf Von Harnack: Liberal Theology at its Height 
(Ottawa: Collins, 1989) , 34. 
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3lt is important to realize that the Cartesian hermeneutic is not limited to liberal 
theology; rather, it is the mainstay of most Western thought after the seventeenth 
century. 
S3 
The main concern in Bultmann~ s hermeneutic, as in Cartesiani~ is the 
understanding of the subject/object relationship and the differentiation between the 
text as object and the interpreter as subject. Bultmann himself admits that his 
hermeneutical investigation is motivated by the subject/object relation. 144 
However, he rejects the traditional Cartesian subject/object schema of the 
Cartesian hermeneutic. 145 Indeed, Bultmann states that "it needs to become clear 
that the genuine relation of historians to history cannot be understood according to 
the traditional [Cartesian] scheme of the relation of subject to object.''146 This is a 
direct reference to the ideal posited by liberal theology, to know history through 
historical-criticism, just as the subject thinks it possible to know objective history. 
Bultmann, in contrast to a Cartesian hermeneutic, which distances the 
subject and object, thinks that the dualism between subject and object leads to 
misunderstanding. As we have seen, he comments that "the historian himself 
stands within history and partakes of it ... he cannot take a stand outside history at 
1
.uBulttnann, "The Case for Demythologizing," in Myth and Christianity: An 
Inquiry into the Possibility of Religion Without A.; :h (New York: The Noonday 
Press, 1966) , 65. 
145Ibid., 58. 
146Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 137. 
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an 'Archimedean point' .''"147 In contrast to a Cartesian hermeneutic Bultmann 
denies a subject's ability to objectively analyze an object Instead of separating the 
subject and object Bultmann understands the two as a union (not unlike the flesh 
and divinity, and. history and eschatology, of John l:14a) and comments that ''the 
most subjective interpretation is the most objective.',.r48 Bultmann thereby 
dissolves the clear subject/object dualism of a Cartesian hermeneutic. 
Bultmaoo's Anti-Cartesian Thought 
It must be noted that Bultmann is not simply adopting a philosophy and 
dismissing all theological understanding. Before going too far in discussing 
Cartesianism and post-structuralism it is necessary to show that Bultmann' s anti-
Cartesian thought is based primarily in the New Testament. Thielicke, for 
example, considers Bultmann to inappropriately take over Heidegger' s philosophy 
and consequently end with fatal results.149 Yet as Schmithals notes: 
Various statements which claim-sometimes in triumph--to have refuted 
Bultmann, because here and there or basically or altogether his theology fails 
to agree with the philosophy of Heidegger, or because Bultmann has 
1
"7Bultmann, The Presence o[Etemity, 127. 
1
"
11Ibid., 122. See also, Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 138f. 
149flelm.ut Thielicke, Modem Faith and Thought, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990) , 12. 
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misunderstood Heidegger' s philosophizing, or because he does not come up 
to Heidegger or has used Heidegger' s analyses in a way which the latter did 
not intend, do not affect Bultmann 's theology even if they are right; for it is 
not Bultmann 's intention to take over the philosophy of Heidegger.150 
It is common to misrepresent Bultmann by delving into modem philosophy and 
forgetting that Bultmann is working from the New Testament. It is, therefore, 
necessary to show that Bultmann's anti-Cartesian thought is based in l:l4a, not a 
modem philosophy. 
The fact that Bultmann and Heidegger see a similar problem, namely, the 
traditional subject' object schema, and that Bultmann uses some ofHeidegger's 
conceptions for clarification, does not necessitate an inherent link between 
Heidegger and Bultmann. 151 This is best explained by Bultmann himself: 
I can refer to Friedreich Gogarten's work 'Demythologization and the 
Church'~ which makes it clear that we do not necessarily subscribe to 
Heidegger's philosophical theories when we learn something from his 
analysis. The fact is that Heidegger attacks a problem with which 
theologians have grappled since Ernest Troeltsch, namely, the problem of 
history ... and the subject-object schema . _ . needless to say~ we may learn 
from others besides Heidegger. If we learn those things better elsewhere, it 
is all to the good. But they have to be leamed.152 
150Schmithals~ An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bu/tmann, 18. 
151To focus exclusively on Heideggerwould turn the discussion ofBultmann to 
abstract conceptions of 'being' and 'existence', while the intent of the discussion 
is, in contrast, to focus on John 1: 14a and history. 
193ultmann, Myth and Christianity, 58. 
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Furthermore, Cassedy states, in regard to post-structuralism and the thought of 
Heidegger, that "it would be simplistic to say that all the latest postmod~ 
deconstructionist, and leftist theories 'come from' Heidegger."153 So although 
there is a Heideggerian influence on Bultmann and post-structuralism, it is not 
legitimate to simply reduce the thought ofBultmann to post-structuralism or 
Heidegger. 
More specifically, Bultmann, in response to such attempts to reduce his 
thought to Heideggerian categories, said that "the New Testament is not a doctrine 
about our nature, about our authentic existence as human beings, but rather is the 
proclamation of this liberating act of God, of the salvation occurrence that is 
realized in Christ."r54 Bultmann's thought is to be understood through the New 
Testament, not through modem secular speculations on being. As Perrin 
comments that the distinction between Bultmann and Heidegger is "to be fmmd in 
the view of the possibility for authentic existence: for Heidegger it arises 
' spontaneously out of human existence,' for Bultmann it is 'made possible by 
lS3Steven Cassedy, Flight from Eden: The Origins of Modern Literary Criticism 
and Theory (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 193. 
rs.;Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 26. 
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God'. "tss Once again, Bultmann 's thought is bound to the New Testament and its 
theology. 
Buitmann realizes that he is often misrepresented and his thought reduced 
to a particular philosophy (especially Heidegger): 
Over and over again I hear the objection that demythologizing transforms 
Christian faith into philosophy. This objection arises from the fact that I ... 
make use of conceptions developed especially by Heidegger in existentialist 
philosophy. We can understand the problem best when we remember that 
demythologizing is an hermeneutic method, that is, a method of 
interpretation, of exegesis. Hermeneutics means the art of exegesis. ts6 
Demythologizing is not philosophical speculation, but is a tool of New Testament 
study. Bultmann is a unique and independent thinker as acknowledged by 
Schmithals: 
His theology is independent, unmistakable, and not to be explained as an 
addition to the works of his teachers; we may have uncovered its most 
important historical roots, but that does not mean that we have explained it as 
a combination of liberal and dialectical theology in the garb of Heideggerian 
conceptuality." ts7 
In contrast to an emphasis on a philosophical basis Bultmann says that: 
When critics have occasionally objected that I interpret the New Testament 
with the categories of Heidegger's philosophy of existence, I fear they have 
lSSPerrin, The Promise ofBultmann, 61. 
156Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 45. 
mschmithals, An Introduction to the Theology ofRudo/fBultmann, 19. 
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missed the real problem. What ought to alarm them is that philosophy all by 
itself already sees what the New Testament says. 151 
In other words, Heidegger does not create Bultmann.'s thought, it was already to be 
found in the New Testament. Bultmann clearly states that demythologizing began 
in the New Testament itsel£1~9 Th~ as Macquarrie notes, Bultmann 's use of 
Heidegger is a matter of clarification of conceptual matters, but is not 
foundational: "the existential analytic [ofHeidegger] is not the source of 
Bultmann's theology. The New Testament is the source."160 The source, in the 
present study, is found more specifically in John l: 14a, and the exegesis thereof. 
Although Bultmann cannot be simply reduced to a philosophy or 
philosopher, there is an interesting and fruitful comparison to be made with 
Giambattista Vico ( 1668-17 44 ). Vico saw the problem of Cartesianism long 
before both Bultmann and Heidegger and thereby affords an interesting 
perspective on a common difficulty with Cartesianism. In fact, on the basis of 
their anti-Cartesianism, Paparella has noticed a link between Vico' s and 
15
'Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 23. 
159Bultm~ Jesus Christ and Mythology, 32. 
160John Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing: Bultmann and his Critics 
(London: SCM Press, 1960), 168. 
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Bultmann' s demythologizing.161 Paparella states that "properly speaking Vico is 
the grandfather of modem hermeneutics even though. little credit is accorded to 
him [nevertheless] this approach ofVico is later followed up in Bultmann's 
attempt at demythologizing."162 Levine maintains that the thought ofVico also 
runs into the thought of Collingwood.163 And it can be said that it is Vico who 
influenced Collingwood more than anyone else. 164 It is interesting, then, to note 
that Bultmann considers Collingwood to have the most accurate understanding of 
history, while he only refers to Heidegger in passing in the Gifford lectures. 16s 
It is thereby appropriate to discuss the interesting connection between 
Bultmann and Vico, yet no intent is made to equate the two, or to reduce Bultmann 
to a Vicoian influence. Rather, Vico may help to further clarify the Cartesian 
problem seen by Bultmann, and make it evident that Bultmann did not simply 
161Emanuel L Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 
(San Francisco: EMText, 1993), 47. A case can be made, as noted by Bultmann 
himself, that Johann Gottfried Herder (1784-91) has parallel thought to Vico, yet 
Bultmann does not decide if Herder was, or was not, influenced by Vico. See 
Bultmann, The Presence of Etemity, 80. 
162lbid., 4 7. 
163Joseph M. Levine, '<;Objectivity in History'~ Clio 21:2 (1992): 127. 
1~R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: University Press, 1948), viii. 
165Bultmann, The Presence ofEtemity, 130, 136. 
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adopt a contemporary philosophy. Vico, long before Heidegger, had advanced 
anti-Cartesian thought. 
Paparella states that "it was Vico (1668-1744) who first proposed it [history 
as a paradigm of reality] to his contemporaries as an antidote to the, by then, 
rampant abstract, rationalistic philosophy of Rene Descartes."166 Collingwood 
also states that Vico reacted against the Cartesian claim to rational truths.167 Vico 
reacted against Cartesianism since it led to the idea of history being composed of 
distinct historical facts known once for all. 168 
In contrast to clear and distinct ideas Paparella notes that: 
As an antidote to rampant Cartesian rationalism, Vico, way back in 1725 . . . 
perceived that the whole of reality operates on two paradoxically related and 
complementary poles ... for example ... objective/ subjective. This 
complementarity issues forth not from rationalistic pseudo-unity of 
intellectual categories but rather from an organic unity derived from the 
phenomenon of its very origins. 169 
166Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy ofGiambattista Vico, 29. 
167Collingwood, The Idea of History, 64. 
168Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, 34. 
169Ibid., 177. 
Vico clearly states that the subject and object are complementary in a fashion 
similar to Bultmann.170 It is evident that Vico and Bultmann are rejecting the 
Cartesian separation of subject and object. Cartesianism seeks to distance itself 
from tradition and the myths therein which are seen as sources of deception on 
route to the clear and distinct "Archimedean point. nl7t 
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Vico had already discovered in the eighteenth century that myths transcend 
the Cartesian dualism of subject and object and that interpretation is not to simply 
reject history and myths, but is to overcome the reader's estrangement from 
myths. rn His thought is similar to Bulnnann, but cannot be equated to Bulnnann. 
Yet an interesting discussion could ensue with Vico, a figure that has often been 
silenced though the ages but who, as with Bulnnann, can be heard more clearly in 
postmodemity than in his own time. 
Is Bultmann a Subjectivist? 
It has become clear that placing Bultmann in a Cartesian context will lead 
to a misunderstanding of his thought. Bulnnann' s hermeneutic is actually anti-
170Levine, ''Objectivity in History," 116. 




Cartesian, as was shown through the comparison with Vico. IfBultmann's 
hermeneutic is anti-Cartesian, and not based on a foundational epistemology, must 
he therefore be a subjectivist? This is the conclusion of one of Bultmann 's most 
trenchant critics, Helmut Thielicke. 173 Thielicke is an example of the interpretive 
error of placing Bultmann in the Cartesian dilemma of the either/or dichotomy: 
either Bultmann is a historical-critical proponent or a subjectivist. This shows how 
hermeneutics has been dominated by Cartesianism, and how important it is to 
acknowledge the problem. This problem is not simply the problem of hoeral 
theology or evangelical theology, but the common assumption of an interpretation 
guided by the Cartesian hermeneutic. 
Thielicke exemplifies the confusion of placing a Cartesian perspective upon 
Bultm~ indicating that the evangelical perspective misunderstands him. 
Thielicke focuses so exclusively on the Cartesian dualism that he is forced to call 
Bultmann a subjectivist and completely ignores Bultmann' s insistence on history 
and the use of the historical method. By discussing Thielicke it will become 
evident that a Cartesian assessment of Bultmann is inappropriate, that 
Cartesianism will necessarily reach the conclusion that Bultmann is a subjectivist 
mReginald Fuller, for example, in The New Testament in Current Study, makes 
use ofThielicke as one of the main critics ofBultmann's work. Also, Thielicke is 
included in Kerygma and Myth. 
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(or a historical critic). We will suggest that post-structuralism should be discussed 
as a possible avenue of a more fruitful discussion of Bultmann 's thought. 
Thielicke states that "Bultmann 's theology is the climax of the Cartesian 
inquity ... "and thereby concludes that Bu1tmann's method is only "a variant of 
the principle of Descartes: Cognito ergo sum." 114 Thielicke descn"bes this notion 
of"Cartesian inquiry'' as ~~self-conscious existential" since Bultmann's method is 
found in the '~subjective element."175 It follows, at least for Thielicke, that 
Bultmann is Cartesian since he incorporates the subjective as the defining category 
of understanding. 176 
Since Thielicke considers Bultmann to operate exclusively in the subjective 
side of the subjective/objective dualism he thinks that Bultmann is unable to 
n
4Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 45-46. 
175Thielicke, "The Restatement of New Testament Mythology," 146. 
176 At the risk of adding confusion it is necessary to clarify Thielicke' s terms. He 
uses the term Cartesian to describe a subjectivist hermeneutic, and non-Cartesian 
to describe an objective hermeneutic. It is evident that Thielicke considers an 
objective method to be of great value, while a subjective method to be wrong 
headed. Thus, what Tbielicke calls Cartesian would be in agreement with what 
Bulnnann calls Cartesian, but what Thielicke calls non-Cartesian would still be 
called Cartesian by Bultmann. It is important, then, to understand that from a 
Bultmannian perspective Thielicke, despite using the term non-Cartesian, never 
leaves the Cartesian. 
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maintain any fonn. of objective knowledge. All Bultmann has, according to 
Thielicke, is a subjective consciousness, an example of being caught in the 
''shadows of our own consciousness."177 More specifically, Thielicke states that 
Bultmann' s pre-understanding is the "exclusive listening to the voice of one's own 
existence prior to the text [which] surreptitiously gives rise to a very problematic, 
sharply delineated, and rigid self-understanding which also becomes an arbitrary 
schema." 178 Thielicke's conclusion that Bultmann's hermeneutic is problematic 
and arbitrary, is a direct consequence ofThielicke's Cartesian perspective which 
necessitates a foundation; and seeing this foundation in Bultmann as resting in the 
subjective side of the Cartesian dualism-the pre-understanding and the self-
concludes that it must therefore be arbitrary in contrast to an objective foundation. 
So far Thielicke has labeled Bultmann as a Cartesian thinker, interpreting 
him as operating exclusively from the subjective side of the Cartesian dualism. In 
an attempt to clarify the objective side of the Cartesian dualism Thielicke actually 
furthers the confusion: '~hile the present situation and its questions have to be 
considered, they must not become a normative principle nor must they be allowed 
to prejudice the answer; they must be constantly recast and transcended in 
1
'11Jbid., 147. 
178Tbielicke, The Evangelical Faith, 58. 
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encounter with the text."179 Thus,. Thielicke' s example of good interpretation-the 
objective side-is what Bultmann would still call Cartesian and an illusion since it 
is impossible to transcend all prejudice; indeed, if one actually could there would 
be no interpretation. Yet Thielicke, blind to this point,. simply states that 
"Bulnnann is not objective but is prejudiced by his self understanding. ''110 Hence, 
Thielicke understands Bultmann' s hermeneutic principle-demythologizing-as 
abandoning objectivity and as finding a home in the arbitrary subjective. 181 
Although Thielicke notes that Bultmann refuses to be labeled a 
subjectivist,. tB2 he cannot see Bultmann in any other light. Thielicke functions 
exclusively within a Cartesian hermeneutic and is left with no option but to 
consider Bultmann as a subjectivist. tsJ In the "violent hierarchy" of Cartesianism, 
Thielicke must choose the subjective or objective as the proper mode of 
hermeneutics, and he chooses the latter on the grounds that it is less arbitrary. 
t
79Ibid., 127. Compare this to Bultmann's comment that to silence subjectivity to 
gain objectivity is "the most absurd [thing] that can be imagined." New Testament 
and Mythology, 85. 
lSOibid., 59. 
utThielicke, "The Restatement ofNew Testament Mythology," 159. 
mThielicke, The Evangelical Faith, 60. 
l83fuid., 109. 
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Thus, Thielicke is left discrediting any notion of subjectivity: "when theology 
focuses so exclusively on man's self-consciousness and proclaims so exclusively 
what in the resultant pre-judgement he can regard as significant for him, the past 
and the contingent are banished to the realm of the irrelevant .. . all that is left is 
the Cartesian £.''1114 For Thielicke the "Cartesian I" must be "given up to death'' 
along with Bultmann 's hermeneutic.11s 
Despite Tbielicke' s critique of Bultmann he fabricates a weak attempt to 
give Bultmann a bit of credi~ but in so doing does a great disservice to Bulnnann 
and ends up constructing a naive view ofBulttnann's method, as is demonstrated 
in his statement that "it is important to keep in view Bulunann's ultimate objective, 
which is to secure a firm basis."186 Bultmann is far from wanting to secure a "firm 
basis"; rather, Thielicke is simply projecting his own need for a hermeneutic based 
on a foundational epistemology. This ultimately leads Thielicke to reject 
Bultmann' s hermeneutic as based in "secular philosophy''; the logical conclusion 
being anti-religion with. "fatal results."187 There is a real question regarding 
184Ibid., 111. 
185£bid., 159. 
186Thielicke, ''The Restatement ofNew Testament Mythology," 174. 
187Ibid., 149. 
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whose method produces "fatal results"; as Thielicke says~ the "Cartesian I" must 
''be given up to death.'~ The implications ofThielicke's Cartesian hermeneutic are 
revealed in his statement: "the implication [ofBultmann's hermeneutic] is that it 
would be nearer to the truth to say: 'The Word did not become flesh' . nlA 
The above discussion illustrates how confusion tends to reign in critiques of 
Bultm~ due to the critics themselves being mired in a Cartesian hermeneutic. 
Macquarrie notes the confusion involved in the interpretation of Bultmann and 
states: 
The result [of numerous critiques of Bultmann] is bewildering in the extreme~ 
not only because one set of critics regards as a virtue what the other set 
abhors as a vice~ but also because it frequently happens that contradictory 
charges are made against Bultmann and he could not possibly be guilty on 
both counts at once. ts9 
Once ag~ these contradictory charges arise from the forced bi-polar decision 
posited by Cartesianism between the subjective and the objective. The interpreter 
could as easily slide to one side as the other. Since it is difficult to categorize 
Bultmann it follows~ as noted by Ogde~ that "from both the right and left 
responsible critics have repeatedly charged that Bultmann's view is, strictly 
speaking, not a view at alL but an uneasy synthesis of two different and ultimately 
111Ibid., 148. 
189Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, 30. 
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incompatible standpoints."190 Thielicke,. as a responsible critic~ has missed the 
base of Bultmann' s hermeneutic entirely and has shown the inadequacy and 
confusion that is created by a Cartesian approach to BuJtmann 's hermeneutic. The 
confusion regarding the interpretation of Bultmann arises as a result of prying into 
the thought of Bultmann from a Cartesian perspective. The problem of the 
Cartesian perspective is noted by Ott: 
[In] their rigid adherence to the subject-object pattern Bultmann 's critics are 
blinding themselves to the real purport of his theology . . . it becomes a 
'subjectivist phenomena' or an ' immanent experience~. This is because they 
are either unable or unwilling to realize that Bultmann is seeking to banish 
the complementary tenns ' subject' and 'object' from the theological scene.191 
In fac~ Bulnnann calls any objective or subjective thought Cartesian since his 
hermeneutic is a synthesis of the two rather than one or the other. Yet Thielicke 
cannot function outside of those very terms since he cannot even consider giving 
any credence to the subjective side of the dualism because that, he fears~ would 
end in chaos. This fear of the subjective chaos is noted by Bernstein as the 
inherent anxiety of Cartesianism which: 
190Schubert Ogde~ Christ without Myth (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961) , 
99. 
191Heinrich Ott, ''Objectification and Existentialism." in Kerygma and Myth: A 
Theological Debate vol. II, 313f. 
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Leads us to an apparent and ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive 
Either/Or. Either there is ... a fixed foundation ... or we cannot escape the 
forces of darkness that envelope us with madness, with intellectual and moral 
chaos.192 
The Cartesian hermeneutic necessitates reality as an eitherlor.193 Hence, Thielicke 
is stuck in the either/or dualism of the subject and object and thereby is unable to 
understand Bultmann 's hermeneutic which rejects this Cartesian antithesis 
between the subject and object relation. and instead accepts a synthesis of the 
subject and object. 
This inability ofCartesianism to see outside of the subject/object dualism is 
a real problem in traditional discussions ofBultmann's hermeneutic of 
demythologizing. Yet the Cartesian habits are so ingrained in Western thought 
that they are difficult to ascertain and even more difficult to remove. Adam notes 
that it is important: 
... to point out that the assumptions we modem biblical interpreters make 
are not eternal truths, but are habits that we have gotten into after an earlier 
period in which we had different habits. The impetus toward a postmodem 
approach to philosophy, to art and literature, to life in general-including 
biblical interpretation-comes when critics begin to see some of these habits 
as unnecessary, and others as downright bad. 194 
1
'12Bemstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 18. 
193Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, 150. 
1~Adam, What is Postmodem Biblical Interpretation? 5. 
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It is the assumed acceptance of Cartesianism that makes it difficult for Thielicke to 
see his Cartesian habit Further, Paparella states that"the sheer arrogance ofthe 
Cartesian mind-set is exhibited by the insistence that it is the only valid 'objective' 
view of what constitutes reality, while other views or paradigms can only proceed 
out of ignorance and have therefore little, if any, intellectual value."195 In other 
words, to accept any perspective other than Cartesianism would be seen as 
madness. 
Yet Bernstein maintains that the concern should not be to choose the better 
side in the Cartesian either/or, as if one fact or another offers more security (as 
Thielicke chooses the objective side for security), but to "exorcize the Cartesian 
anxiety and liberate ourselves from its seductive appeaL"196 The problem of 
Thielicke' s discussion of Bultmann lies in Thielicke' s nonnative appraisal of the 
objective side of the Cartesian dualism and his inability to even imagine the 
possibility of locating the discussion in a anti-Cartesian context. 
Post-structuralism is, however, in contrast to liberal and evangelical 
theology, willing to so enter discussions that 'exorcize the Cartesian anxiety' and 
leave the Cartesian hermeneutic behind. Hence, it is apparent that the difficult 
195Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, 33. 
196Bemstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 19. 
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communication between Thielicke and Bultmann is analogous to that between 
Cartesianism (modernity) and anti-Cartesianism (postmodemity). Therefore, a 
post-structuralist context is a real possibility for a continued discussion of 
Bulttnann It will not suffice to simply label BuJtmann an historist or subjectivist 
simply because a Cartesian hermeneutic necessitates such a decision.. Post-
structuralism must be seen as a legitimate field for continued BuJtmannian 
discussion. Yet once again, we should be careful to not reduce Bultmann to post-
structuralism, but rather simply seek a better context within which to understand 
him. 
Bultmann and Post-Structuralism 
Post-structuralism is~ of course~ to be understood as differentiated from 
structuralism. Structuralism bases itself on the Cartesian subject/object 
dichotomy197 and on the project of gaining an objective description. 198 Post-
structuralism, on the other han~ offers a critique of the Cartesian dualism of 
subject and object, and also the resultant illusion of ''a self-foundation and self-
197Gayatri Chakravorty Spiv~ trans.~ J. Derri~ OfGrammatology (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press~ 1976), lvii. 
198Sarup~ Post-Structuralism and Postmodemism, 39f. 
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justification of philosophy."l99 Moreover~ Sarup defines post-structuralism thus: 
"reading has lost its status as a passive consumption of a product ... post-
structuralists have produced critiques of the classical Cartesian conception of the 
unitary subject-the subject/author as originating consciousness~ authority for 
meaning and truth. "200 It is evident that post-structuralism is reacting against 
Cartesianism, and it is this aspect of post-structuralism that is of most interest for 
ourmqwry. 
We have already seen that there are significant points of contact between 
Bulnnann and post-structuralism. It may now be objecte<L however~ that Bultmann 
is too dogmatic to be compared with the indeterminacy of post-structuralism. Or~ 
alternatively, placing Bultmann in the melting pot of post-structuralism's 
subjective chaos may seem apt It will be shown that neither argument is 
acceptable since neither Bultmann, nor Derrida (as a representative of post-
structuralism), are as indeterminate and negating as is assumed. Thus, the 
comparison between Bultm.ann and post-structuralism need not be simply rejected, 
but must be discussed in light of their common anti-Cartesian perspective. 
l99Rodolphe Gasche~ The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of 
Reflection (Cambridge~ Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 176. 
200Sarup, Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, 3. 
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Furthermore, serious inquiry excludes simply reducing either Bultmann or Denida 
to normatively loaded terms, such as existential, indeterminacy or negation; rather, 
it is necessary to seriously discuss their view points. 
Just as Bultmann has difficulties with Cartesianism, so does Derrida. 
Gasche states that "in order to come to grips with Derrida' s thought, one must 
reject the temptation [a Cartesian temptation] ... simply to determine it as 
antisystematic ... [because] philosophy has [in the past] contained two absolutely 
symmetrical alternatives of a systematic and a nonsystematic thought.''20t In other 
words, since Derrida critiques systematic thought it is assumed that it must be the 
case that he is nonsystematic. And, of course, nonsystematic is a pejorative term, 
as is subjectivism. Yet, as Norris states, "deconstruction is not just a species of 
deconstructive or all-purpose nihilistic rhetoric. "202 To interpret Bulnn~ and 
Derrida, it is necessary to break the habit of Cartesian thought, and anxiety, that 
immediately reduces any seeming attack on meaning and objectivity to nihilism or 
201Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, 178. 
202Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodemism: Critical Theory and the 
ends of Philosophy (Toronto: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1990), 150. 
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indeterminacy. Criticisms ofBultmann often stem from such fear rather than 
understanding. 203 
Derrida, according to Norris~ runs into similar problems: 
The whole charge-sheet [against Derrida] falls to shreds if one only takes the 
trouble to read what Derrida has written, instead of relying on a handful of 
simplified slogans ('all reading is misreading', 'there is nothing outside of 
the text', "meaning is always indeterminate' and so forth) which are no doubt 
well suited to the purpose of knock-about polemics,. but which just do not 
begin to engage deconstruction at anything like an adequate level. 204 
One needs to work through Derrida' s deconstruction, and not rely on "'simplified 
slogans," if Derrida is not to be unfairly dismissed as '"an absurd nihilist.''205 And 
this is exactly what happens: 
One could cite many passages from Derrida's work where he asserts that 
deconstruction is not, as his opponents would have it, a discourse with no 
further use for criteria of reference, validity, or truth; that it squarely 
repudiates the 'anything goes' school of postmodem hermeneutic thought; 
203 An analogy to the problem of interpreting Bultmann and Derrida can be made 
with a scientist looking at a slide under a microscope, knowing that the slide is 
labeled as blue, but seeing it as green; then, rather than thinking it through and 
realizing that his eyepiece has been colored yellow, he suspects that the slide must 
be labeled wrong, just as Bultmann and Derrida must be wrong since their 
comments are contradictory. But the contradiction, as a problem, is a result of the 
viewpoint (eyepiece) of the interpreter, not necessarily the thought of either 
Bultmann or Derrida themselves. 
2~orris, What's Wrong with Postmodemism, 148. 
20sGayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Spivak Reader, ed. Donna Landry and Gerald 
MacLean (New York: Routledge, 1996), 81. 
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and that to deconstruct naive or common sense ideas of how language hooks 
up with reality is not to suggest that it should henceforth be seen as a realm 
of open-ended textual ~freeplay' or floating signifiers devoid of referential 
content. 206 
Because of this problem Denida has had the difficulty of dissociating his work 
from irrationalist and nihilistic views that assume truth and reason are obsolete.207 
Similarly, Thielicke, in my view,. misreads Bultmann and thereby labels him 
a subjectivist intent on the negation of history. 208 This then leads to a similar 
problem as found with Derrida,. and Bultmann also attempts to defend himself. 
He says, "my critics have objected that my demythologizing of the New Testament 
results in elimination ... on the contrary, I am convinced that my interpretation 
exposes its meaning.''209 The intent ofBultmann's demythologizing, in contrast to 
assumed negation on behalf of the Cartesian interpreter, is not to negate or 
subtract, but is to interpret. 210 Bultmann states that "demythologizing is an 
hermeneutic method, that is, a method of interpretation, of exegesis [and] 
206Christopher Norris, Uncritical Theory (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992), 
17. 
207Ibid., 17. 
208Thielicke, "The Restatement of New Testament Mythology," 159. 
2~ultmann, Kerygma and Myth, 205. 
110Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 18. 
hermeneutics is the art of exegesis."2u The point of demythologizing is 
interpreting, not negating. Furthermore, it is significant that Bultmann 's 
interpretation makes use of the historical-critical method, even ifhe does 
renounce any foundational claim for it 
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ln contrast to the Cartesian perspective, which focuses on the negative and 
negating properties of demythologizing, it is valuable to look at how post-
structuralism can add to a discussion of Bultma.nn_ The point that Spivak makes is 
applicable to Bultmann's demythologizing, namely, that in deconstruction the 
emphasis should not be on the negative aspect, but on the production of 
meaning.:nz Spivak states that ''deconstruction does not say there is no subject, 
there is no truth, there is no history ... It is not the exposure of error. It is 
constantly and persistently looking into how truths are produced. n 213 Moreover, 
she comments that "the task is to dismantle ( deconstruire) the metaphysical and 
rhetorical structures which are at work in the text, not in order to reject or discard 
them, but to reinscribe them in another way."21" Once again, deconstruction does 
211Ibid., 145. 
212Spivak, Of Grammatology, Ixxv. 
213Spivak, The Spivak Reader, 27. 
214Spivak, Of Grammatology, lxxv. 
\. 
77 
not annihilate meanin& but rather is very concerned with meaning. Detrida 
himself comments that deconstruction is affirmative interpretation. 21~ Hence, 
Derrida ~ s deconstructio~ as noted by Bruns, does not aim at nihilism: "Derrida 
himself insists on this ... deconstruction is comic not tragic. It aims at 
emancipation, not tragic divestiture . . . so it is not as cold as cold can be.'~216 
It may be allowed by some critics of deconstruction that it can produce 
meaning, but they still might insist that that very meaning is bound in 
indeterminacy. Yet Eco states: 
Even the most radical deconstructionists accept the idea that there are 
interpretations which are blatantly unacceptable. This means that the 
interpreted text imposes some constraints upon its interpreters. The limits of 
interpretation coincide with the rights of the text (which does not mean with 
the rights of its author).217 
Derrida' s deconstruction is not "a species of all-licencing sophistical freeplay"218; 
rather, it subscribes to a certain rigour.219 Deconstruction cannot be written off as 
215Jacques Derrida, Spurs (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 37. 
216Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modem, 219. 
mumberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1990) , 6. 
21~orris, What's Wrong with Postmodemism, 15 L 
219Gasche, The Tain oftheMi"or, 178. 
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engendering interpretive chaos. Derrida himself states that deconstruction is 
''subject to a certain historical necessity."220 In reference to critical reading he 
says that "to recognize and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and 
requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this recognition and 
this respect; critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and 
authorize itself to say almost anything."221 Concerning this statement of Derrida, 
Norris comments: 
It specifically disowns the attitude of free-for-all hermeneutic licence-or the 
down-right anti-intentionalist stance--that Ellis [among others] so persistently 
attributes to Derrida. And of course it must also create problems for those 
among the deconstructionist adepts who likewise take him to have broken 
altogether with values of truth and falsehood, right reading, intentionallity, 
authorial 'presence' and so forth.222 
It is only a general and naive view of deconstruction that assumes an "anything 
goes" mentality. Eco states that "Derrida would be--and indeed be was-the first to 
deny that we can always use language as an instance of drift and the first to refuse 
220Derrida, Of Grammatology, 162. 
221Derrida, OfGrammatology, 158. 
222Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism, 162. 
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the objection that there are no criteria for verifying the reasonableness of a textual 
interpretation. " 223 
Bultmann would concur with Derrida and maintains that if a norm is not 
acknowledged then relativism and nihilism follow.224 In contrast to relativism and 
nihilism Bultmann also understands the importance of history and the tools of 
historical investigation. He states that "since the New Testament is a document of 
history, specifically the history of religion, the interpretation of it requires the labor 
of historical investigation.''ru Furthennore, Bultmann concludes that "there can be 
no question of discarding historical criticism."226 
The above discussion shows that a comparison of Bultmann with post-
structuralism would be fruitfuL and need not be constituted by any popular notion 
of indeterminate meaning and nihilism. To say that Derrida ends at nihilism 
through deconstruction, or that Bultmann ends with nihilism as the logical 
conclusion of demythologizing, can only be said witlrin the framework of a 
Cartesian perspective, which neither Bultmann nor Derrida accept. 
223Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, 37. 
22~Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 42. 
225Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 251. 
226Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, 3 L 
80 
.John 1:14a Revisited 
Bultmann, th~ has anti-Cartesian affinities which distance him from his 
contemporary critics, such as Thielicke, and place him within a conceptual 
framework which has closer ties to post-structuralist thought. It is mistaken to 
argue that Bultmann's demythologizing, and/or post-structuralism, can be reduced 
to negation and/or subjectivism and are thereby untenable or incompatible theories. 
Negation and subjectivism do not truly apply to Bultmann's demythologizing, or to 
post-structuralism, specifically Derrida's deconstruction. Hence, it is mistaken to 
say that demythologizing cannot be compared to post-structuralism-
deconstruction-because of the latter's indeterminacy, and, conversely, it is also 
mistaken to say that both Bultmann and post-structuralism are compatible due to a 
mutual indeterminacy. 
Post-structuralism can throw light on Bultmann's hermeneutic of 
demythologizing. However, while post-structuralism affords a most useful 
perspective for discussing demythologizing, there are significant differences. It 
would be very misleading to leave the impression that Bultmann is a post-
structuralist. Instead, we find in the importance of John 1: l4a for Bultmann's 
thought, the significant difference between Bultm.ann's hermeneutic and post-
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structuralism. In other words~ there is a textual basis to demythologizing. 
Moreover, there is also a theological basis. Demythologizing is parallel to the 
theological principle of justification by faith. Thus, Kuschel is right in his 
assertion that a new perspective is required, but the focus of this new perspective is 
found in Bulttnann~s exegesis of 1:14a. 
Bulttnann insists that 1: 14a describes an. historic event, namely, the Word 
becoming flesh. Hence, he does not seek to demythologize this eschatological 
event, for he says: 
Are there still any surviving traces of mythology? There certainly are for 
those who regard all language about an act of God or of a decisive, 
eschatological event as mythological. But this is not mythology in the 
traditional sense, not the kind of mythology which has become antiquated 
with the decay of the mythical world view. For the redemption of which we 
have spoken is not a miraculous supernatural event, but an historic event 
wrought out in time and space. We are convinced that this restatement does 
better justice to the real meaning of the New Testament and to the paradox of 
the Kerygma. For the Kerygma maintains that the eschatological emissary of 
God is a concrete figure of a particular historical past, that this eschatological 
activity was wrought out in a human fate, and that therefore it is an event 
whose eschatological character does not admit of a secular proof. Here we 
have the paradox of . .. the classic formula of John 1:14: 'The Word became 
flesh' .'!:2.7 
Bultmann's insistence that 1:14a cannot be demythologized may appear cryptic, 
particularly to the Cartesian mind set that abhors the mention of a paradox. 
221Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, 43f. 
Nevertheless, it stands as evidence that Bultmann is not nihilistic and that he 
listens to the text Bultmann explicitly states that 1:14a is "an historic event 
wrought out in space and time" and is included in the "meaning of the New 
T estam.ent." 
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In contrast to abstract principles or timeless truths of endless indetemrinate 
speculations, 1: 14a points to the singular distinctiveness of a particular body/flesh 
and a radical historical event that leaves the subject/object dichotomy behind.228 
Bulttnann maintains that the significance of the verse is directly related to its 
concrete history, since without the distinct nature of the verse it would have little 
significance for humanity. He states, "this even~ if it is to have any significance 
for men, must take place in the human sphere."229 And once again, it is not a 
generality, as noted by Bultmann: "the Revealer appears not as man-in-general ... 
but as a definite human being in history."230 As such 1: 14a is focused on the flesh 
and historical event of a definite person seen only in the flesh. 231 It is thereby 
evident that I: 14a is, for Bultmann, not a matter of human wisdo~ which would 
22SSultmann, The Gospel of John, 10. 
229Jbid., 61. 
230Bultmann, The Theology of the New Testament, 41. 
231Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 63. 
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speculate upon what is revealed and what knowledge is gained, but rather is a 
radical divine paradox. As Fuller comments, 1: l4a is, for Bultmann, not immersed 
in mythological language, but is a ''concrete piece of history," that cannot be 
determined through historical investigation, and as such reveals the "real 
stumbling block with brutal clarity. "232 
To distance demythologizing from human wisdom Bultmann makes use of 
the theological principle of justification by faith, which is a consistent 
continuation of his thought. Petrin notes that any discussion of Bulnnann 's 
demythologizing can quickly become a discussion of Bultmannian theology. 233 As 
a natural extension of a discussion of Bultmann' s thought, the theological principle 
of justification by faith affords insight into the function of demythologizing. Thus, 
rather than considering Bultmann's thought to be based on a particular philosophy 
it is important to see that demythologizing is based on 1: l4a and the theological 
principle of justification by faith. 
The relation between demythologizing and justification by faith is noted by 
Bultmann himself: 
232Fuller, The New Testament in Cu"ent Study, 11. 
233Perrin, The Promise of Bultmann, 78. 
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Our radical attempt to demythologize the New Testament is in fact a perfect 
parallel to St. Paul's and Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone apart 
from works of the law ... it destroys every false security and every false 
demand for it on the part of man ... The man who wishes to believe in God 
as his God must realize that he has nothing in his hand on which to base his 
faith. He is suspended in mid-air, and cannot demand a proof of the Word 
that addresses him. 234 
Moreover, according to Bultmann, the only way to find security is, paradoxically, 
to let all security go.23s It is not surprising then, as Macquarrie notes, that the 
mere mention of demythologizing results in the arousal of fear, 236 particularly for 
those who adhere to a Cartesian hermeneutic which revolves around the building 
of security and foundations. 
The resultant Cartesian anxiety of Bultmann' s contemporaries is noted by 
Bultm~ who states: 
They want to know how I rescue myself from the situation created by my 
critical radicalism; how much I can save from the tire . .. I have never yet 
felt uncomfortable with my critical radicalism; on the contrary, I have been 
entirely comfortable. But I often have the impression that my conservative 
New Testament colleagues feel very uncomfortable, for I see them 
perpetually engaged in salvage operations. I calmly let the fire bum .... 237 
234Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, 210f. 
235Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, 122. 
236Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, 14. 
237Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, 132. 
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Bulnnann' s contemporaries, entrenched in Cartesianism, naturally felt 
uncomfortable with Bultmann's demythologizing, as it did little to contribute to 
their task of seeking a ground through human wisdom. In fac~ it presents a threat 
to such a project. 
In contrast to a Cartesian hermeneutic, Bultmann 's hermeneutic, in a 
manner similar to post-structuralism, questions the ability of human wisdom to 
establish a foundation. In other words, just as justification by faith negates the 
security of works, so demythologizing undermines the epistemological security 
sought by the Cartesian hermeneutic. The result of demythologizing, then, is that 
1: 14a becomes the paradoxical 'foundation', while a Cartesian hermeneutic seeks 
to make the self (human wisdom) the foundation. 
The fire that Bultmann allows to bum is not an annihilating fire that bums 
all to the ground as the Cartesian hermeneutic would insist; rather, what is burned 
are the false objectifications and illusory foundations of Cartesianism. 
Demythologizing and justification by faith can actually be seen as the fire which 
burns the human wisdom and Cartesian hermeneutic which attempts to 
circumscribe the paradox of 1: 14a, but demythologizing leaves 1: 14a fully intact. 
Indeed, demythologizing not only leaves John l :l4a intact, but brings to the fore 
the very radical nature of 1: 14a. 
86 
Ironically, it is hberal theology and the history-of-religions school which, 
according to Bultmann, '1>um" the kerygma to the ground by reducing it to m 
absolute idea or timeless truth.231 Then the essential paradox and stumbling block 
of 1: l4a is removed. BuJtmann himself states that his hermeneutic "stands, on the 
one hand within the tradition of the historical-critical and the history-of-religion 
schools and seeks, on the other hand, to avoid their mistake which consists of the 
tearing apart of the act of thinking from the act of living and hence of a failure to 
recognize the intent of theological utterances. "239 Thus, it is seen that there is an 
inverse relationship between Bultmann' s demythologizing and the Cartesian 
hermeneutic: the former bums human wisdom and the latter bums the paradox of 
1: l4a itself. 
It is evident that Bulnnann is not stating explicitly what the significance of 
1:14a is other than being a paradox and a stumbling block. The ''definite human 
being in history'' gives occasion to a paradox and questioning, rather than any 
particular awe or timeless truth. Bultmann states that "to be confronted with the 
231Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, 262. 
239J3ultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 250. 
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revealer is not to be presented with a persuasive set of answers but only to be faced 
with a question.. " 240 And that is where Bultmann wants it to end, with a question. 241 
Going too far and speculating on indeterminate answers, the illogical nature 
of no answers, and other such questions is the work of a Cartesian hermeneutic, as 
Derrida remarks: ''in classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the 
peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the 
two terms governs the other ... or has the upper hand."242 The Cartesian 
hermeneutic attempts to gain the "upper hand" through a separation of subject and 
object in an attempt to gain the "Archimedean point" In contrast to the Cartesian 
hermeneutic, Bultmann maintains a peaceful coexistence between the subject and 
object since they cannot exist independently, 243 they are not in a "violent 
hierarchy." 
Instead of seeking an "upper hand" it is necessary and sufficient to look at 
1: 14a itself as a paradox and stwnbling block. Vico maintains that we "must 
240Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 66. 
241Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, 30. 
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transcend the subject/object dichotomy of Cartesianis; however, this approach, 
with its ambiguities and unresolved contradictions, paradoxes, conflicts and 
suffering, may not be a neat, clear~ clean world of scientific concepts, but it is 
certainly less sterile and more authentically true to existence and human 
experience."2-u Bultmann also insists that his hermeneutic is not a matter of human 
wisdom that can be drawn into a concise logical conclusion through a Cartesian 
hermeneutic, but is an event encountered in history that is accountable to human 
experience.245 Madison notes that this anti-Cartesian hermeneutic, and the 
resultant undermining of traditional oppositions of subject and object, leads to an 
understanding of "how the imagination is the very heart of understanding, which is 
not merely a matter, as the traditional metaphor bad it, of cfacing the facts' ."2.16 
Thus, rather than attempting to justify demythologizing through a Cartesian 
hermeneutic, Bultmann lets it stand on its own, including the paradoxes and its 
offense to reason. As noted by Douglas Cremer, Bultmann' s hermeneutic must be 
2
""Paparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, 89. 
2
"'
5Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, 207. 
z.u;Madison, The Hermeneutics ofPostmodemity, 190. 
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accepted "as paradoxicaL unresolved, always subject to critique, and always open 
to new possibilities, a frightening and insecure position. "247 
Both Vico and Bultmann met general disregard because of their rejection 
of Cartesianism, the accepted hermeneutic of their time. Paparella concludes that 
Vico' s thought was ahead of its time, but thinks that now we are better able to see 
the value of his thought in light ofbecoming aware of the Cartesianism paradigm 
of reality which still pervades our culture. 241 Collingwood also considers Vico' s 
critique of Cartesianism to be '"too far ahead of his time to have very much 
immediate influence."249 Likewise, Bultmann was misrepresented in his time due 
to the prevalent Cartesian hermeneutic and its associated epistemological habits. 
Funk observes that Bultmann has been distorted through the reading of him 
through liberal and/or orthodox eyes as though twentieth-century theology were 
merely an extension of the nineteenth. Moreover, he notes that if Bultmann had 
been seen as turning a new comer in theology he may have been better 
2
"
7J. Douglas, Cremer, "Protestant Theology in Weimar Gennany," Journal of the 
History of Ideas 56:2 (1995): 308. 
2nPaparella, Hermeneutics in the Philosophy ofGiambattista Vico, 41. 
249Collingwood, The Idea of History, 71. 
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understood.250 Now, with the advent of post-structuralism, we are better situated to 
discuss anti-Cartesian hermeneutics such as those found in Bultmann and Vico. 
Bultmann 's distinctive demythologizing hermeneutic is, therefore, seen 
more clearly in a post-structuralist light, even if it is not to be equated with post-
structuralism. Bultmann's distinctive demythologizing hermeneutic is built on the 
paradox and stumbling block of John 1: 14a, and bas a parallel function to the 
theological principle of justification by faith. Post-structuralism thus has a 
different agenda from that ofBultmann, but it nevertheless affords a most useful 
context within which to understand his truly remarkable originality and seminal 
thought. "Vivendo, immo moriendo et damnando fit theologus, non inte/ligendo, 
legendo, aut specu/ando. '1251 
250funk, Faith and Understanding, 12. 
251Martin Luther, Lecture on Psalm 5 in Luther's Worb V(Weimar Edition), 
p. 183. 
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